Chapter 1
Philosophy in Education and Education in Philosophy

THINKING PHILOSOPHICALLY

It is the aim of this opening chapter to retrieve the educational significance of speculative experience from within the contradictions of different forms of educational theorising. This means philosophising with a Janus face, turned towards both its contingency within the conditions of its possibility, and its experience of its freedom in recognising these conditions. I will show below how some perspectives within the philosophy of education and educational theorising adopt only one-sided positions towards this aporetic modern experience of freedom and necessity. The cost of doing so is the suppression of philosophy and education as relation. Those who would seek either to free us from or further to engulf us within the scepticisms of historicism in fact only reinvent ever more ingenious ways to dominate the aporias that define both attempts. It is philosophy—and here philosophy has to mean speculative philosophy—wherein aporia can have educational and formative significance for both sides in the dispute. To introduce the way that the recent work of Gillian Rose underpins this philosophical perspective, I begin by noting that she describes the significance of modern social relations upon modern thinking in the following way:

I mean to draw attention to a construal (which I could call Hegel or Nietzsche) which has expounded the autonomous moral subject as free within the order of representations and unfree within its preconditions and outcomes, and modernity as the working out of that combination (Rose, 1996, p. 57).

To illustrate what is meant by the philosophical experience borne in and by speculative thinking, I will turn at this early stage to Hegel and Kierkegaard, and return in a moment to Rose’s notion of ‘the broken middle’.

Hegel distinguishes between our natural consciousness and our philosophical consciousness. The former is the consciousness that experiences the world as it appears. The latter is our thinking about those experiences, but it also contains a further opposition within it. There is a consciousness that relates, now, to the relation between natural and philosophical consciousness. This third partner in the work of recognition and misrecognition is spirit and it takes different forms at different times.
in history within different social and political relations. In the sense that philosophical consciousness is known to itself in a way that natural consciousness is not, we can say that, for Hegel, philosophical thinking is our thinking about thinking. But it is important to remember the triadic and not the dualistic nature of this activity. If spirit is not recognised as a representation of the (negative) relation between thought and object, then there is neither philosophy nor education in the relation, and thought is denied its participation in the antithesis by which it is known to itself. Spirit is not the resolution of the relation between natural and philosophical consciousness, it is the form in which their relation appears for us, a form that is characterised by recognition and misrecognition. Against readings of spirit in Hegel that argue for spirit as final, as the suppression of others, and as imperialism, Rose counters that spirit in Hegel’s *Phenomenology* ‘means the drama of misrecognition that ensues at every stage and transition of the work—a ceaseless comedy, according to which our aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other, and provoke yet another revised aim, action and discordant outcomes’ (Rose, 1996, p. 72). Spirit in this sense, as the opposition of theory and practice, has immediate import for the experience of teachers.

Our philosophical consciousness arises, then, in our experience of the surprises and unintended outcomes that reason provides for us. Hegel says that since natural consciousness ‘directly takes itself to be real knowledge’ (1977, p. 49) then these experiences that oppose it have ‘a negative significance for it, and . . . count for it rather as the loss of its own self’ (ibid.). One might imagine here a teacher who, after a disappointing lesson, comes to question whether or not she really is good enough to be a teacher. Doubts creep in and undermine her belief in herself as able to perform effectively. There is here something distinctly uncomfortable but at the same time educational about such experiences. Left merely as doubt, such thoughts can be insidious and undermining. But within the philosophy of the teacher as it will be explored below, these doubts are formative, for they educate us to realise that comprehension is always ‘provisional and preliminary’ (Rose, 1996, p. 72). This, says Rose, is ‘the meaning of Bildung, of formation or education, which is intrinsic to the [Hegelian] phenomenological process’ (ibid.). This education is where the truth of the relation between teacher and students becomes also the truth of the teacher who, in relation to herself, is the philosophical teacher. What is significant in this account is that spirit and education as provisional can sit alongside the realisation of the absolute.¹ We must suspend for the moment an examination of the ‘difference’ that such educative relations can make for the practitioner.

Of course, when things get too difficult we often seek consolation by not thinking too much. That, however, will not do for a philosophy of the teacher whose business is precisely the difficulties of learning and education. Besides which, there is one final and dramatic conclusion that Hegel draws from this education of consciousness about its knowledge of and relation to the ‘real’ world. If anyone were to try to withdraw from the difficulties presented to them by the negation of certainties, he argues that

they would find this impossible. We are always experiencing the world negatively. It is never how it first appears. Our philosophical consciousness always undermines any stability we might fleetingly claim. Hegel states here:

consciousness suffers this violence [of negation and of philosophy] at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction. When consciousness feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat from the truth, and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing. But it can find no peace. If it wishes to remain in a state of unthinking inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its inertia (p. 51).

Thus we might say that for Hegel education is as inevitable and as unavoidable as experience, the only difference being that our philosophical consciousness is often poorly educated in how to understand itself in relation to natural consciousness as learning and as education.

Kierkegaard has a slightly different way of exploring the same idea of philosophy as thinking about experience. When we ask a question, he says, we are admitting to not knowing (the truth of) something. He says that by asking about the truth I am also experiencing the absence of truth, or untruth. I am in doubt. Again the educational experience here is a negative one. Doubt is what brings natural consciousness into relation with another aspect of itself, the self-consciousness or awareness that knows that it doubts. Consciousness therefore learns about itself from within this relation. It brings what we know into relation with what we do not know, and into a further relation with the consciousness that knows that it does not know. This consciousness he calls the third partner in a relation between truth and untruth (see Kierkegaard, 1985, p. 169). Like Hegel’s notion of spirit, this third partner is our way of knowing the experience of opposition between knowing and not-knowing. It is our learning that we do not know from within difficult experiences and irresolvable dilemmas. In the philosophies of the teacher presented below in Part III, including from Kierkegaard, each, in different ways, shows how teachers can learn from the oppositions that they experience.

These two philosophical ways of thinking about thinking will be implicit within the experiences of the teacher described in terms of master and servant outlined in Part II below. In Part III they will appear more explicitly as ways in which teachers’ work can be philosophically comprehended as the experience, the relation, of the master and servant. To anticipate this, we can say here that the teacher who, in a philosophical sense, appears as master represents the certainty of our natural consciousness. He is the enlightened one, the one who is sure enough of the world to induct others into it. The teacher who appears philosophically as servant, on the other hand, represents the negation of the identity of that master and of his understanding of his work. These teachers, in a variety of ways, seek to negate the students’ immediate understandings of the world through the doubts that are produced by critical questioning and thinking. In addition, they aim to reveal to the students not only how those
understandings are dependent upon the world as it is, but also how they prevent different ideas about how the world might be, or should be, from being taught or even thought about. These teachers aim to serve the critical education of their students by teaching for what some call deconstruction and others see in terms of emancipation. If certainty, or natural consciousness, is the ‘identity’ of the master and doubt is the ‘identity’ of the servant, then potentially, together, as the experience of what we will come to see as the broken middle, they are the contradictory or oppositional relation that is the philosophical teacher.

It is necessary to keep in mind that in these two philosophical models what is of central importance to the two consciousnesses is that they are inextricably related to each other in and by thought. For both Hegel and Kierkegaard the experience of doubting what we know is the third partner in any duality, or the relation of certainty to doubt. It is this experience that the study that follows takes as philosophy proper, and that means as philosophy and education. For Hegel as for Kierkegaard, natural consciousness is always what we know, and philosophical consciousness is the doubt and uncertainty of ‘knowing’ what we know. But they cannot exist apart from each other. As such, certainty without doubt is blind for it does not know of itself, and doubt without certainty is empty for it has no content of its own. It is only in their relation to each other that natural consciousness and philosophical consciousness produce the work that is our (philosophical) learning and education. It is this relation wherein we will find the philosophy of the teacher.

THE BROKEN MIDDLE

Gillian Rose has sought to retrieve the speculative experience for philosophy against what she believed was the domination of the neo-Kantian tradition.

Philosophy as I practise it has a different orientation based on a different logic and a different story. From Plato to Marx, I would argue, it is always possible to take the claims and conceptuality of philosophical works (I say ‘works’ not ‘texts’: the former implying the labour of the concept inseparable from its formal characteristics as opposed to the latter with its connotations of signifiers, the symbolic and semiotics) deterministically or aporetically—as fixed, closed structures, colonising being with the garrison of thought; or according to the difficulty which the conceptuality represents by leaving gaps and silences in the mode of representation (Rose, 1996, pp. 7–8).

Around the term ‘the broken middle’, Rose argues that the latter approach, the aporetic, galvanises ‘the difficulty of thinking in the wake of disaster, without generating any fantasy of mending the world’ (p. 9). Refusing the consolation of repairing that which appears broken, Rose finds the speculative experience to be where our modern experiences find themselves, not only re-presenting a broken middle, but also determining
that re-presentation in and by their own thinking. It is one of the implications of the broken middle that whilst not being able to repair that which we separate without re-presenting that separation, we can nevertheless seek to renew our own understanding of this most ancient way of thinking. Part of this renewal means comprehending how the torn halves of the middle are most often related to each other without reference to the philosophical experience of their separation. This is where the appearance of the dualisms of modern and postmodern, theory and practice, subject and object, etc., relate to each other as oppositions but without such dualisms being experienced as the broken middle of education and philosophy. It is as if philosophical experience, when it is characterised by the aporetic, the difficult, has no substance at all, and is to be suppressed, again, in favour of one side of the dualism or the other. This misrecognition and suppression of philosophical education affects philosophy as much as educational theorising.

Kant’s separation of the necessary but unknowable transcendental law and the realm of practical ethics have shaped philosophy since his time in very particular ways. His diremption of metaphysics and ethics underpins many subsequent dualisms. How can universal, unknowable, a priori metaphysical laws become at one and the same time particular moral actions chosen freely by autonomous persons in civil society? In particular, it becomes the question of theory and practice. Yet this question of theory and practice, of metaphysics and ethics, is not itself experienced by persons from within the broken middle of their relation. Rather, it is experienced, or appears to be experienced, exclusively from the side of the person: how can I be free and yet obey? How can I be autonomous yet also under metaphysical a priori necessities? What is of absolute significance here is that it is within the personal experience that the problem comes to be judged. The illusion here, borne by all modern reflection, is that the object of experience is not also the experience of the object. By this chiasmus I mean to draw attention to the way that experience works with a concept of the object that has already formed the relation between experience and the object. The representation of that prior political relation, and the repetition of that representation, is the universal that then defines the relation between universal and particular as aporetic. In other words, the universal—we might say here the transcendent—is present in the conditions that rule out its possibility of being known. The recognition of this misrecognition is our education regarding the illusions of the appearance of the universal in relation to the particular. This cannot be separated from the political forms that illusion takes. This contingency forms the substance of speculative enquiry.

This relation to the relation, or the difficulty that is education and philosophy, is the no-man’s land where one gets shot at from all sides. For the analytic mind such speculation is not pure reason; for the post-foundationalist mind it is absolutely pure reason. The former retains a purer form of metaphysics; the latter retains a purer form of ethics. Western-style philosophy is currently riven into this division.
In her early work Rose offered critiques of the two paradigms that emerged out of the illusions of the personal perspective. The paradigm of method gave priority to the question of the rules of the synthesis of perceptions into objects of enquiry, and their validity, and culminated in Durkheim’s social facts *sui generis*. Alternatively, the paradigm of morality gave priority to the legitimacy of values, culminating in Weber’s sociology of culture. A more recent development, more pertinent to the philosophy of education, and to educational theorising in particular, is the way that the relation of method and morality is played out between the grounding and non-grounding of values. I will explore this in some detail in the following sections of this chapter. Suffice to say at this point that philosophies of education and educational theory have powerful voices within them arguing the case for ethical relations. Such calls are often borne out of frustrations with—some would say failures of—the ability of the metaphysical to sustain clear and objective values. Instead of the illusory and imperialist objectivity of a transcendental ethic, there is a clamour for a ‘new ethics’ (Rose, 1996, p. 1), one generated without metaphysical presuppositions, and created out of genuine, perhaps face-to-face encounters. On the one hand, the desire behind such new ethics exhibits ‘a low tolerance of equivocation’ (p. 2), whilst nevertheless claiming elements of the same for the ethic of the encounter. On the other hand, the speed with which ethics permits itself to claim ‘the other’ for itself as its philosophical object, even in claiming it as totally other, bears witness to the poverty of philosophical experience in educational terms. When ethics begins with the other, philosophy, and its ability to comprehend the social and political formation of the concept of the other, and our own determination in relation to that formation, is deemed to be at an end.

What Rose writes of the warring between the libertarians of free market exchange and the communitarians of ‘ethnic and gender pluralities’ (p. 5) applies also to the warring camps in education, where battles rage between the individual virtues and moral objectivity of the *phronimos* (in many guises), on the one hand, and the pluralism implicit in the many manifestations of the ethical, on the other.

These two apparently warring engagements have a lot in common; and they participate in the very archetype which they claim to overthrow . . . By maligning all putative universality as ‘totalitarian’ and seeking to liberate the ‘individual’ or the ‘plurality’ from domination, both . . . disqualify themselves from any understanding of the actualities of structure and authority, intrinsic to any conceivable social and political constitution and which their opposed stances still leave intact (Rose, 1996, p. 4).

Rose saves her sharpest criticisms for the philosophers who, she says, ‘blame philosophy for the ills of civilisation [and] have themselves lost the ability to perceive the difference between thought and being, thought and action’ (1995, p. 118). Indeed, Rose finds here a suppression of the relation between education and philosophy that, whilst claiming for itself
the high ethical ground of non-foundationalism, has in fact only served to reinforce the illusions inherent in modern social relations. She writes,

terrified of their own inner insecurity at the border between rationality and conflict, between the new academic political Protestantism and politics as the art of the possible, they proceed as if to terminate philosophy would be to dissolve the difficulty of acknowledging conflict and of staking oneself within it. To destroy philosophy, to abolish or to supersede critical, self-conscious reason, would leave us resourceless to know the difference between fantasy and actuality, to discern the distortion between ideas and their realisation. It would prevent the process of learning, the corrigibility of experience. This ill-will towards philosophy misunderstands the authority of reason, which is not the mirror of the dogma of superstition, but risk. Reason, the critical criterion, is forever without ground (1995, pp. 118–119).

It will be argued in what follows that this speculative working of philosophy offers a philosophy of the teacher that addresses the same kinds of problems as those outlined above, and explores how such philosophy speaks directly to the contradictory experiences of teachers’ practice, without taking sides between metaphysics and ethics. Into the interminable quest to find either the metaphysical dogma or the slip into relativism of the opposing camp, or the ingenious ways in which justifications are made by both sides to have avoided such moves, I want in a moment to offer a way of philosophising about the teacher that not only understands the illusions of this opposition, but that also acknowledges that ‘it may be the very severance of ethics from metaphysics that undermines the value and effectivity of both metaphysics and ethics’ (Rose, 1996, p. 2). What Rose leaves unsaid here is that it is the education that this separation holds for us wherein modernity can be addressed according to the dilemmas that are its substance. The speculative can retrieve the non-foundational experience of thought at the same time as the authority and integrity of reason. We do not need to choose, nor do we need to make teachers choose between metaphysics and ethics, or between abstract and post-foundational or critical educational theory. Rather, they can find themselves in the broken middle of their experience of the relation between them.

However, I recognise that such philosophical critique can often seem only to cloud further what are already reasonably complex philosophical arguments. The question will arise as to what use such critique can be within the practice of education. In the rest of the book I will address this concern by trying to show how difficulty itself, in all forms of educational practice, can be shown to have meaning—deep philosophical and spiritual meaning—for those who experience it. But I want also now to counter the perception that this kind of speculative thinking is not appropriate as educational theory and practice by describing briefly how such models as those of Hegel and Kierkegaard described above have been and continue to be the underpinning of an undergraduate honours degree programme in Education Studies at the University of Winchester, the context of my own work.3
PHILOSOPHY AS COURSE STRUCTURE

At Winchester we have developed an undergraduate programme in Education Studies that reworks the structure of the speculative philosophical experience into the model for progression from levels one to three. The programme was validated in 1992 as a field of study within the Combined Honours programme. The team of tutors who initiated the field were mostly involved previously in the professional studies component on the Bachelor of Education primary teacher training course. As the amount of professional studies on such courses was reduced, so tutors looked to other possibilities for their teaching. In line with a number of other Higher Education Institutions, King Alfred’s College, as it was then, was widening its undergraduate provision with a modular Combined Honours Programme, and Education Studies joined that programme in 1992 with an initial cohort of seventeen students. It was by no means clear who would apply for Education Studies, nor, to begin with, what their reasons would be for doing so. This uncertainty was reflected in the tutors’ own ambivalence regarding the identity of the subject.

The programme that was validated in 1992 was constituted by the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, politics, psychology, history, etc., which seemed to make up the study of education. Education itself was not seen to be more than the sum of its parts. In the thirteen years since its inception, this definition of Education Studies has been transformed by a new group of tutors. They have, in several reviews and revalidations since 1994, sought to retrieve a much more ancient and yet equally contemporary notion of education as a subject of study, one that does not rely on the integrity or otherwise of other disciplines for its own coherence and relevance. In essence, we were retrieving this ancient notion of education not only as a form of social, political, cultural and historical critique, but also as a formative experience that can shape and determine, as Plato saw it, both the soul and the city.

It is in seeking to nurture this understanding of education as social and political experience, critique and development that we have concentrated our efforts on trying to ensure that our programme is not just about education but is educational in itself. In doing so, we have sought to avoid the programme’s becoming merely a catalogue of modules that lists different aspects of educational provision but lacks any educational telos. All programmes in Higher Education are presumably ‘educational’, but we felt that it fell to Education Studies to include within its own field of study the question of exactly what ‘educational’ means here. In so doing we called upon the notion of experience found in Hegel and Kierkegaard, described briefly above, and have set this at the heart of the structure of our learning programme. This means that we neither merely study sites of education provision—classrooms, curricula, methods, policy—nor, also, just the theoretical perspectives that can be applied to them—modern, postmodern, feminist, cultural, political etc. We also examine what is educational for us in our experience of actually doing this work. As such we want to move Education Studies on from the disparate and incoherent
understanding of education that is produced by the ‘disciplines approach’ by examining what is (and is not) educational about such disjointed and fragmented experiences, both of the disciplines themselves and in the lives of our students. This, of course, may suggest to some that the programme rejects recent postmodern critiques of meta-narratives and merely chooses arbitrarily to impose one of its own. Such criticisms are suspended here, but they have been implicit in the discussion above regarding the relationship of philosophy and education, and they will be returned to below in Parts II and III. However, the programme interprets the relationship between narrative and meta-narrative, between synthesis and difference, in an altogether different way from that found, for example, in Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* (1984). What we are attempting to do here is to retrieve Education Studies as what might be called *the philosophy of cultural critique.*5 We believe that studying what is actually *educational* about anything that calls itself education can lead to a coherent identity for the academic study of education. The astonishing corollary of this claim, if it can be sustained, is that Education Studies then becomes the terrain on which the disputed meanings of the experience of ‘culture’ in other academic subjects is fought out. In addition it becomes an essential element of all academic study and perhaps the basis for determining notions of ‘value added’ in higher education.

To achieve this philosophy of cultural critique, the structure of the Education Studies programme at Winchester has been designed to embody a threefold model of (1) experience, (2) theory and (3) critique, which unfolds during the three years of undergraduate study. In short, we have based this model of experience, theory and critique on the speculative and educational structure of philosophical experience outlined above. As will be seen below in Part III, while still the headteacher of the Nuremberg *Gymnasium*, Hegel put into practice his own threefold model of philosophical experience, consisting of immediacy, mediation and spirit. In more logical terms these correspond respectively to the stages of the abstract, the dialectical and the speculative. For Hegel, abstractions appear immediately but are immediately mediated in (dialectical) experience by the understanding and are consequently known in experience as always objects *for us*. The final (speculative) stage of this experience is the attempt to know and understand the relation between immediacy and mediation in such a way that the relation is not suppressed by being totally understood or totally misunderstood. Hegel himself in his letters noted that his students very rarely, if ever, achieved the third stage. He also noted that they tended to find the second stage, the dialectical, very difficult, preferring the concrete certainties of abstraction, immediacy and the world of objects.6 The same challenge is evident in our Education Studies programme, where often the comfort of voice is preferred to the risk of theory, at least to begin with. Most students, however, do eventually take the risk of suspending their disbelief. Level One is designed to enable students to begin the programme without necessary prerequisites in terms of subject content or knowledge. The first half of this initial year introduces students to educational ideas from so-called ‘great’ educators.
but also offers students the chance to reflect upon their own educational autobiographies, with a view to applying to those experiences some of the new concepts that they gain in Education Studies and other fields. The intention is not to argue that any experiences in the students’ prior education have been right or wrong, successful or ineffective, but to seek to enable them to learn different perspectives and different concepts with which to make sense of their experiences and, where appropriate, to criticise them. Most importantly, in Year One, students are encouraged to develop their own voice, to write about themselves, the world as they perceive it and their educational experiences within it.

Level Two is devoted almost exclusively to introducing students to a range of theoretical perspectives. The aim here is for students to realise that their own understandings of the world and of education can be supplemented, and in some cases replaced, by a reworking of the world through one or more of these theoretical perspectives. The voice that has been encouraged in Year One is now transformed as we ask that students subsume their voice within such theoretical perspectives. This can and does include postmodern perspectives. At this stage the students’ own opinions of the theories, although obviously important, are not as significant as the degree to which they understand those theories. Their voice will return, but for now it is being tutored by the work of a wide variety of theoretical perspectives.

Importantly, we do not offer Level Two students theory within the traditional academic disciplines of sociology, history, psychology, etc. Instead, theories and theoretical perspectives are offered from any and all disciplines that we feel can play their part in shaping and contributing to the educational experience of the programme. So, for example, students will be introduced to Marxism, critical theory, critical pedagogy, models of learning, feminism, anti-racism, social and political theory, as well as to issues of epistemology, representation and ontology. These theoretical perspectives are used to explore concepts relating, among others, to gender, ‘race’, nature, power and the child. What is particularly challenging about the Level Two programme for students and tutors alike, is that we have set ourselves the aim of making the skills of theorising generic to all modules. This means it should not matter whether, as a result of module choices, a student studies ‘race’ or gender or power because each module should be exploring and practising the same kinds of theorising and the same discipline of understanding. Generic learning outcomes for all modules at Level Two have proved a significant benefit to this way of working.

Levels One and Two together, but the latter in particular, constitute a training in theory—not abstractly, but as a theorising and an experience about ‘what is’. Theory is always related to live issues but students are encouraged to suspend what they think about what ‘ought’ to be, i.e. practical philosophy, until Level Three. This leads to the often-heard lament from students: why can’t I give my own opinions? The observation that Pythagoras’s students had to remain silent in their learning for the first four years finds little sympathy. Our explanation is that we are trying to
enable their opinions on ‘what ought to be’, i.e. on practice, to be informed by theories of ‘what is’. They are then able to use those theories and concepts with which they agree as support for their own ideas and opinions. In this way we hope the students move from opinions based on personal experiences to theoretical perspectives in which, often, the merely personal and arbitrary is lost in the work of understanding. This understanding is then applied to matters of personal and social interest, or, better, theory is then able to be found (or found to be hidden) in what counts as practice. In addition, some students ‘take off’ specifically as a result of their direct experience of the difficulty of the relationship between theory and practice, particularly in their examination of the social and political formations that the theory/practice relationship repeats. They learn of the unintended consequences that accompany all attempts to mend the world and are often plunged into innovative forms of theorising in which educational theory and Continental philosophy maintain a difficult but fruitful alliance.

Level Three, then, seeks to move students from learning about theory to becoming theoretical in practice. This development marks the return and enhancement of the voice expressed in Year One and suppressed in Year Two. Year Three is characterised by an emphasis on students’ critique informed by what is hopefully becoming a difficult relationship to theory. As indicated above, inevitably the experience of aporia is central to this final year. Students learn quickly that the divide between theory and practice repeats itself despite theirs and others’ best attempts to re-theorise new and ingenious ways of overcoming the divide. Third-level modules try not only to recognise this repetition and its consequent aporias but to offer philosophical insights into this experience, in particular into its educational significance and import.

I will take this opportunity to quote from two recent dissertations by Level Three students to illustrate the kinds of insights that the programme can enable. The first, from a dissertation on doubt, notes that to discover, as Hegel, Kierkegaard and Weil have done, that doubt has a significant truth, is to unlock the potential to glimpse something profound about consciousness. Doubt has truth. Perhaps doubt is truth, and this truth is the truth of the self. It is not knowing the true self, but knowing the self through untruth. For these three philosophers, it is knowing the untruth of the self through the truth of God (Cox O’ Rourke, 2002, p. 36).

The second dissertation ends by stating the way of hope from the knowledge of Man’s finite nature and inability to know all is ‘to make a virtue out of the limitation: the boundaries of legitimate knowledge are endlessly changeable,’ (Rose, 1995, p. 129) so we need not fall into nihilism and despair. We experience both sides of the dualisms of community and individual, safety and freedom, knowledge and faith. As finite Man we cannot know both sides of dualisms simultaneously, yet because of the continual protest—the dialectic of

reason—there is hope that we will know both sides eternally, truly eternally . . . [as] a journey, an education, and a life (Pike, 2004, p. 29).

Both authors have chosen to pursue teaching as a career. Their philosophical experiences have inspired in them both a sense of vocation. The more complex reasons why this might be so will be the subject matter of Parts II and III below.

In answer, then, to the question as to what kind of experience Education Studies is claiming as educational, I am suggesting that in the experience in which (critical) philosophical consciousness contradicts (abstract) natural consciousness and knows itself to be spirit as the relation of their misrecognition, there is a notion of the absolute or the true: namely, the relation of philosophy and education known in and for itself. It asks no more and no less than that students have the courage to risk further experiences, to seek more learning by asking more questions, and that they recognise the substance that inheres in such work. The aim of the programme, in the spirit of Hegel (and others), is that students should, in studying education, learn about themselves and about the fundamental significance of education as personal, social, spiritual and political development. Level Three is therefore the year of philosophical experience in the sense that students think about the formative significance of their own experiences and about the difficulties that the necessary structure of these experiences imposes upon them from without and from within. The two quotations from the student dissertations should not hide the fact that for them, as for many others, the work is intensely personal.

I am putting forward the case, then, that through a programme structured around such a notion of philosophical experience, students are offered the chance to make their own difficulties the content of their studies without sinking into the merely reflective. It is to embody what Rose referred to above as ‘the process of learning [in] the corrigibility of experience’ (Rose, 1995, p. 119). The course also stands as testament to the way that instrumentalism and performativity need not dominate the philosophical subject and substance of higher education, as so many within the philosophy of education repeatedly caution.

It is also interesting to note that much of the published work in the philosophy of education and in educational theory is only of limited value on such a degree programme. This is because difficulty is rarely made its own philosophical subject and substance in these traditions. I want, therefore, now to explore in more detail how educational theorising misrecognises (interminably) its own broken middle within the aporias of modern abstract reasoning. In a way similar to Rose’s critique of neo-Kantian sociology, educational theory will be shown to fall into one-sided readings of modern contradictions, and to give priority either to the objective, the subjective or to new ethical relations that claim and reject the middle at one and the same time. Each of these positions is rehearsed now. Where priority is given to the objective, there I will argue philosophy dominates education; where priority is given to the subjective, there education is seen to dominate philosophy; and where priority is given to
an ethical relation there the relation of philosophy and education is both claimed and eschewed at the same time. I will argue that David Carr’s argument for moral objectivity illustrates the domination of philosophy over education; that Nicholas Burbules gives priority to education over philosophy; and that Nel Noddings ethic of care colonises the middle by a notion of duality that is neither philosophical nor educational. These misrecognitions are each, in their own ways, attempts to mend the middle. But, as we will see, to mend the middle is to create new tyrannies and new forms of domination. In Chapter 2 we will begin to explore the social and political determinations that these misrecognitions repeat.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT EDUCATION (CARR)

David Carr’s work represents the middle posited as moral objectivity. ‘Any sensible account of education’, he says, ‘needs to steer a course between reasonable pluralism and indiscriminate relativism’ (Carr, 2003, p. 3). The middle in question concerns the fate of moral objectivity within post-enlightenment thinking. Against the idea that morality is merely a local and contingent phenomenon, perhaps even incommensurable with other local moral discourses, Carr argues that it is still possible for education, in its considerations on theory and practice, to discern ‘groundfloor conceptual considerations and distinctions’ (ibid.). The mistake, as he sees it, of strictly non-foundational critique is that the latter often falls into ‘the old error of dualism’ (Carr, 1998, p. 121) when it opposes ‘the enlightenment fiction of universal moral reason . . . to the conclusion that moral values are merely culturally contingent social constructions’ (ibid.). David Cooper, in the same volume, succinctly sums up the dilemma of the post-foundational paradigm: ‘Either the philosophical positions appealed to are compatible with our actual ways of judging, enquiring and ‘going on’, or they are not. If they are, it is hard to see what radical implications for educational practice there could be. If they are not, what reason is there for accepting those positions?’ (Carr, 1998, p. 46). Carr’s response to this contradiction is to argue for the ground-floor conceptions of common sense and/or intuition. Common sense, he says, provides for the survival of the human species a reasonably accurate correspondence between facts and observations. It is true that ‘there may well be occasions on which we are not sure whether a given moral claim is true or false, but this is also true in other realms of human enquiry and does not generally undermine the point that we often know what is right or wrong with some certainty’ (Carr, 2003, p. 74, emphasis removed). He adds therefore that it is probably the case that ‘our ordinary pre-theoretical intuitions about the nature of theories, values, facts and observations are in good philosophical order’ (Carr, 1998, p. 122). When uncertainty enters we can often know ‘in our bones’ (Carr, 2003, p. 74) what is morally right.

At first glance this might appear as a form of Kantianism. If our bones are where we feel duty then these bones might be the site of desire and
freedom uncontaminated by the particular. But Carr denies any such relationship, arguing that Kant suffers from ‘a particularly virulent form of Cartesianism’ (p. 6). He states:

for Kant there can be no genuine personhood without the freedom of rational autonomy or self-determination–but, in turn, no such self-determination apart from the rational disinterest and impartiality that characterises the moral law: hence, the real personhood of pure practical reason has to be significantly independent of the world of familiar self-referenced (if not self-interested) drives and motives. For Kant the real person is not the empirical self of familiar everyday association, but rather the metaphysical *noumenal* self of transcendent practical rationality (ibid.).

He goes on to say that few would nowadays endorse ‘Kant’s highly metaphysical view of personal agency as rooted in some non-empirical source of rational legislation’ (p. 79).

However this reading suppresses the real significance of Kant’s broken middle of practical reason. Carr is wrong when he suggests that the moral person ‘has to be significantly independent’ of motives. For Kant, the existence of motives is the law of freedom in each of us. Indeed, on one reading at least, Kant is far closer to a moral theory of bones than Carr is, for where Kant leaves the middle open as a site of competing motives wherein duty makes itself known—and in which freedom and necessity are contested—Carr sees it only as a separation of freedom from necessity. His bones, therefore, can tell him when he ought to do something, but he can never know this as a contestation of freedom. His bones, sadly, refuse their own moral significance and are not in fact in good moral order. This is because Carr closes down the very site of contestation that his bones are communicating to him. He argues that ‘once the Cartesian gulf between thought and world is bridged via the common sense idea that our concepts directly identify real features of an external world . . . the way is clear to a more apt view of the relationship of facts to values’ (Carr, 1998, p. 123).

However, this suppression of the aporetic in Kant is only one illustration of a more general problem of the argument within Carr’s work for moral objectivity. At root, the reason that underpins Carr’s desire for moral objectivity—and the fact that it is a desire is of absolute significance here—is, on the one hand, a refusal to accept the consequences of a wholly contingent moral relativism and, on the other hand, an incredulity that morality should be freed from common-sense judgements that are made every day. He states that ‘if it is in the interests of (amongst other things) human survival that our theories about the world are in some perfectly ordinary sense true, how might we know them to be true unless there are observations or facts which our theories do or do not succeed in explaining?’ (pp. 121–122). We have seen that Carr finds the distinction between fact and value at times to involve a virulent Cartesianism—that is, a distinction between mind and the physical. This distinction means for Carr that nothing that is known empirically could be theory-free, and if
nothing is theory-free then, he concludes, ‘any explanation of the nature of theory would be circular’ (p. 122). Quite so. Here, precisely, is one of those philosophical occasions where we do feel something in our bones, where there is, in a perfectly ordinary sense, an observation of facts that our theories do not succeed in explaining. We observe that justifications are circular and self-defeating. Why should this observation, the common-sense experience of contradiction, be ruled out as a valid observation? On what common-sense grounds can this common-sense experience of difficulty and aporia be assumed to be untrue? Why does the gulf between thought and the world need to be bridged unless it does not fit into some pre-judged notion of what the true should be? And is this not precisely the point: to judge difficulty or aporia as leaving morality defenceless against a lack of certainty is already to have to hand a view of exactly what morality looks like when it is certain. The problem with Carr’s response to the aporia of moral reasoning is that it is one-sided. It grants priority to pure desire over and against the experience of desire.

I will illustrate this in two ways. First, by prioritising pure desire over its experience Carr ironically and presumably inadvertently gives precedence to the a priori over the a posteriori, which is the kind of transcendental move that he chastised Kant for making. In having to hand a definition of morality as other than circular and self-refuting Carr has lifted morality free from its determination in motives or in experience. The tables are truly turned here. Not only does Carr reinstate the objectivity of morality as uncircular and, therefore, freed from any contamination in and by the experience of aporia, but, quite the contrary, Kant clearly brings out the aporetic nature of his categorical imperative in his essay ‘On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory but it Doesn’t Apply in Practice’ (1793). In this essay he states that ‘no one can have certain awareness of having fulfilled his duty completely unselfishly’ (Kant, 1991, p. 69). This is ‘too much to ask for’ (ibid.). Perhaps, he says, ‘no recognised and respected duty has ever been carried out by anyone without some selfishness or interference from other motives; perhaps no one will ever succeed in doing so, however hard he tries’ (ibid.).

Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative has suffered, in the philosophy of education as in philosophy in general, from the assumption that it is a heteronomous and external imposition of conduct. Nothing could be further from the case. The fact that the categorical imperative appears external is precisely because the modern zoon politikon is grounded in abstract notions of freedom. In fact, Kant’s categorical imperative is present when we know there is a choice to be made between what we ought to do and what we want to do. The significance of the categorical imperative is that it makes itself known negatively or in its absence, and it makes itself known precisely through the thing that stands in its way, motives. Motives then are fundamentally ambivalent in a philosophical sense. What we want is always accompanied in our bones by what we ought to want. The categorical imperative is present when there is a choice to be made because the choice cannot be made. Motives, says
Kant, are ‘the absolute law itself, and the will’s receptivity to it as an absolute compulsion is known as moral feeling. This feeling is therefore not the cause but the effect of the will’s determinant and we should not have the least awareness of it within ourselves if such compulsion were not already present in us’ (p. 68). Put simply, morality in the first instance is not the decision we make: it is the very existence of the dilemma itself. And against all readings of Kant, including Nietzsche’s, that complained of the smell of cruelty in the categorical imperative, or that see it as the imposition of an external formula or logos, the provisional nature of moral action is built into the ambivalence of freedom and the very existence of morality in the first place.

So, whereas in Kant the clash of motives is the ground, as it were, of freedom, for Carr the refusal of morality as within the self-refuting circle of its being known, or theory, leaves his own notion of morality in danger of being purely metaphysical. If Carr is truly concerned to do justice to the common sense concepts that ‘directly identify real features of an existing world’ (Carr, 1998, p. 123) then he should accept the aporetic nature of moral reasoning as just such a concept. His own work on morality exists in the space opened up by the aporia and is dependent upon it. Eschewing this most fundamental dependency for a preconceived notion of moral objectivity is not to do justice to morality. It is a prejudice that runs counter even to his own notion of ground-floor distinctions that must arise out of ordinary experience. The question really is, how can philosophical sense be made of this experience without importing concepts from outside which are granted hermeneutic privilege? I suspect Carr knows in his bones that he owes everything to the existence of aporia despite never giving his master due regard.

There is a second and equally significant critique of Carr’s common-sense moral objectivity and his assertion of its independence from the circular. If I am right that Carr’s bones feel contradiction whilst at the same time suppressing that feeling, then Carr is in denial of a dialectic in his own reasoning about fact and value. The circle that he claims freedom from for moral objectivity in fact, always, reclaims him to itself. Our common sense tells us that when values are facts, facts are also values. This is not hard to intuit but is much, much harder to comprehend. A dialectic applies here that is the totality of the circle. Values are facts because, with good reason(ing), we believe them to be true; I think Carr is arguing something similar to this. But holding them as true, even by the ‘grain of truth of empiricism’ (ibid.), does not mean that they hold true universally. It is hard to imagine a more common sense observation about the world than this. Yet, as we saw, it is precisely this observation and its dialectical significance that Carr rules as illegitimate and sees as a dualism requiring to be bridged. The dialectic is a much stronger observation than are Carr’s claims for moral objectivity between pluralism and relativism. To live within the circle is to know Adorno and Horkheimer’s formulation for the dialectic of enlightenment. In this case values are already facts; facts revert to values. It is within this dialectic that all morality is to be found. The dilemma is its condition of possibility.
By refusing the dialectic that he feels in his bones Carr is doing more than just overcoming our common-sense experience of contradiction. He is granting priority to abstract epistemology over speculative epistemology. The latter speaks for itself and requires no interventions; we all know that morality—doing the right thing—is difficult. The former, however, has to be asserted against our experience and smuggled in under the guise of healing or bridging the rift between fact and value. There is negation in Carr’s reasoning, for negation is morality. To judge this negation false is to do so in relation to a merely posited notion of morality. Posing as the remedy to the sickness, it is, as Nietzsche would say, only part of the sickness—another symptom of the negation that it denies.

EDUCATION WITHOUT PHILOSOPHY (BURBULES)

A different but equally one-sided approach to aporetic thinking in educational theory is being forged in particular by Nicholas Burbules. A 1997 publication, *Teaching and its Predicaments*, contains in particular one article that tries to explore the educational potential and significance of aporia in teaching and in education in general. In their Introduction to the book, Burbules and David Hansen define a predicament as ‘a problematic state of affairs that admits of no easy resolution’ (Burbules and Hansen, 1997, p. 1). The purpose of their book, they add, is ‘to illuminate new ways of perceiving those dilemmas, to make them more manageable, less debilitating, and perhaps even a source of interest and enquiry on the part of teachers, prospective teachers, and others who care about the practice’ (p. 2). In his own article, Burbules takes as his starting point what he calls ‘the idea of a dilemma—not just a difficult choice between two options, not just a balancing act between alternatives . . . but a recognition of a deep, intractable contradiction between competing aims and values’ (p. 66). Where Carr sidesteps the epistemology of aporia, Burbules recognises this epistemology and describes it as in some important ways ‘tragic’. Against the utopian, Burbules puts contradiction at the very heart of teaching.

The tragic perspective, I suggest, argues *for* a strong sense of hope in education, but one tempered by an awareness of the contradictory character of what we might count as ‘success’, an understanding that gains can always be seen also as losses, and an appreciation that certain educational goals and purposes can be obtained only at the cost of others (p. 65).

He says that he intends here ‘a positive, constructive way to think about teaching and what it can and cannot accomplish’ (p. 66).

Where Carr refused the circle of doubt and knowledge, Burbules recognises the circle and the tragic nature of its dual perspectives as ‘helping us accept the inevitability of doubt and disappointment’ (ibid.) at the same time as freeing us ‘to take those moments of failure as occasions...
for new learning’ (ibid.). This appears then to have overcome the weakness of Carr’s abstract and at root uneducational version of morality by placing doubt at the centre of the theory and practice of teaching. This, I suggest, will resonate far more with teachers in all educational sectors than Carr’s more abstract approach. The advantage, as I see it, is that Burbules recognises the common-sense observation of contradiction that is the actual experience of morality, whereas Carr, as we noted above, in the name of common sense, rules such common sense as invalid. Burbules finds the substance of conflict between ideals and actions to be something worth thinking about. This is to take the dialectic (p. 71) seriously in a way that Carr does not.

He draws attention to five such conflicts or struggles that he says, ‘carry a sense of force and immediacy’ (p. 66). These are authority, progress, canonical texts, diversity and success. Each shares for Burbules the characteristic of struggle and contestability. What Burbules says of the first of these echoes, at least to begin with, one of the major themes of the study that follows in Parts II and III below. For this reason I will quote at length what he says about authority.

Authority is inherent in any teaching-learning relation; it cannot be abrogated or denied even when one wishes to minimise its significance. But authority carries certain costs: It can foster dependency; it implies certain privileges of position that interfere with egalitarian social commitments; it becomes too easily taken for granted in the minds of both student and teacher. Encouraging students to question authority, even inviting challenges to one’s own authority as a teacher, can foster valuable learning—but only a person in authority can do that. In one sense, the very purpose of authority in teaching is to make itself ultimately superfluous (because the students themselves become independent learners and knowledge creators). Balancing such tensions is a skill of good teaching. But the terms of success are not entirely within one’s control. Institutional customs arrogate dimensions of privilege to teachers that conflict with our attempt to manage authority gracefully… At a still deeper level, we who have chosen teaching as a career must acknowledge in ourselves the desires that motivate us. However modest we might endeavour to be, the influence that comes with authority and the pride of seeing our plans and intentions (sometimes) come to fruition are seductive pulls back into the temptation to exercise our authority—though only for the ‘best’ of purposes, of course (p. 67).

This is a perfect summary of the beginning of the philosophy of the teacher as it will be presented later. The struggle here is clearly laid before us; it is a struggle between teaching and learning. To teach, I must accept the asymmetrical nature of the teacher/student relationship. To learn, the student must do the same. How then is the teacher to understand this dilemma that is her authority? This will be returned to in detail later in the book.
The other struggles that Burbules lists are each in their own way related to this issue of authority. If education means progress, then this judgement must reflect the authority of the one who knows over the one who is yet to learn. If education means insertion into culture via canonical texts, then these texts must be claiming the authority to represent one culture over others. If education aims at diversity it must recognise within itself that its authority is largely granted for initiation into conformity and homogeneity. Lastly, any definition of what is to count as success in education must rest upon an authority that excludes competing definitions.

Burbules cites a number of ways in which responses to dilemma seek its resolution. These vary from one-sided prejudices, to compromises or middle grounds, to reconciliation of the oppositions into a new third way, to the denial of the opposition itself, and finally to seeing the extremes of the dilemma as incommensurable. Against any approaches that might synthesise or compromise these difficulties, Burbules argues that instead one should keep the dialectic tension alive for the creativity that this tension can provide. He says he is against any ‘middle ground’ (p. 71) because the unresolved tension of oppositions offers the sense of ‘open boundaries, [and] of unfinished business’ (ibid.). Where Carr finds dualism to be an error, Burbules argues for looking at the world ‘through a dual lens’ (ibid.) without any reconciliation. It provides a tragic yet productive experience. The tragic requires no one path, no one method or subject of study; it recognises that in giving teachers may also be taking away; and it offers an acceptance of uncertainty. Yet it is productive because in contradiction we learn to be open to new possibilities that, in turn, must destabilise and undermine any complacency that teachers have allowed themselves within their privileged positions of authority. In turn, the tragic fosters non-teleological, i.e., exploratory, teacher–student relationships. ‘This attitude,’ says Burbules, ‘respects deep complexity . . . [and] the sense of a perpetually open question, always susceptible to new perspectives, new pathways, new discoveries. This suggests a transient and provisional sense of knowledge and understanding’ (p. 73).

Burbules adds four further implications of the tragic perspective. It recognises aporia as ‘a rich fertile moment of educational potential’ (ibid.); it helps teacher and student to think differently; it casts justified suspicion on any one method in favour of ‘a deep pluralism of approaches and perspectives’ (p. 74); and it negates any sense of self-sufficiency or independence.

What kind of reason, then, or epistemology does Burbules find within this dialectic of aporia? In a different article he argues the case for a postmodern defence of ‘reasonable doubt’ (Kohli, 1995, p. 82). By this he means to enquire whether ‘reason’ is to be abandoned altogether as too imperialistic or reconstructed ‘along less formal, transcendental, and universal premises’ (ibid.), what he calls ‘reasonableness’ (p. 84). He lists four virtues of such reasonableness: a striving for a concept of objectivity that is non-dogmatic and open to debate; acceptance of being fallible and taking risks that ‘run the possibility of error’ (p. 93); pragmatism that
reflects tolerance and incompleteness; and finally judiciousness wherein is to be found reasonableness in judgement. This last, says Burbules, is ‘the key quality to being able to hold competing considerations in balance, accepting tensions and uncertainties as the conditions of serious reflection’ (p. 96).

He defends himself against the view that such virtue is merely the amour propre of civil society. Such virtues are shared, he says, by different people in many cultures with otherwise completely different value systems. Nevertheless, they are not ‘universals’ (p. 97); they are generalisable ‘in the sense that others might be persuasively brought to recognise them’ (ibid.). Whereas universalism asserts qualities over people whether they hold them or not, generalisation offers a weak universalism based upon agreement.

Burbules concludes that reasonableness has ‘an essential educational element’ (p. 98) because in dialogue learning occurs

through encountering new, challenging, and often conflicting ideas; through making mistakes and trying to learn from them; through persisting through levels of difficulty and discouragement to something new and worthwhile . . . [which] in turn depends upon a range of communicative and other relations the learner forms with other people (p. 99).

I want to make two points in response to this. The first is that where Carr offers philosophy without educational experience, Burbules offers education without philosophical experience. Burbules begins with doubt and aporia, and suggests that they have a fundamentally educative character. But he does not allow this educational experience to know of itself, or to be substantial in any way. Therein he suppresses any philosophy of education, taken here to mean a science of experience as the relation between education and philosophy. In Burbules the dialectic of opposing values is granted status as an aporia and as part of the educational process. But the question Burbules must answer here in relation to philosophy is: how does he know this to be educational? What criteria are being employed here such that education can be recognised? It would appear that for Burbules education resides in making mistakes and having to change our minds or moderate our views in the light of experience. Yet this criterion is never itself made the content that must be risked. The ‘reasonableness’ of pluralism is raised above the risk that it might be a mistake precisely within the nature of aporia upon which it is based. As such, the definition of education rests upon a presupposition that leaves it immune from the struggle for objectivity in and for itself. This presupposition is fuelled by Burbules’ inclusion of Hegel within the list of ways that dilemmas are reconciled. This is the most common and mistaken reading of Hegel in philosophy of education and in educational theory. In seeing Hegelian synthesis as ‘another resolution’ (Burbules and Hansen, 1997, p. 71) he denies himself the philosophical resources needed both to retain the elements of opposition (which he argues for) and to
recognise what is learned from within their contradictory experience. In turn, he rules out spirit as the relation of philosophy and education in which the oppositions have their educational significance for us.

Hegel, then, when read speculatively and according to the logic of education that underpins his whole project, can provide what Burbules seeks but eschews. Instead of seeing Hegelian philosophy as reconciliation, let us see it instead as the consciousness of a mistake known to itself as that mistake. This, as we saw above, is what the notion of spirit means for Hegel. If the recognition of a mistake is not itself recognised as a philosophical experience of consciousness by consciousness, then the education that lies in aporia has no educational or philosophical significance at all. This is the fate of the dialectic in Burbules. Its recognition as the formative process of thinking, its own re-presentation of re-presentation is always suppressed by the more pragmatic view that representation cannot sustain its own truth.

The cost of education becoming such pragmatism is that our philosophical experiences have no educational value or significance in themselves. In Burbules we are not allowed to know that we do not know; we are only allowed to fetishise our not being sure as activity with result. This is fetishism of a higher order than that of commodities, for this is the fetishism of culture per se. I will explore this idea again in the following chapter, but what I mean by this is that Burbules defence of reasonableness has traduced reason into a mere rationalism detached from its being known in and as philosophy. This detachment releases education from itself—from its work on itself and from the result of that work—so that now education appears to have a life of its own. Ironically, it is the very attempt not to predefine education that objectifies it. The illusion here is that education can become generalisable. But this illusion is the result of the separation of education from its own experience in and as philosophy. In Burbules the mistake is granted a life of its own away from spirit and as such away from the philosophical education that inheres within formation and re-formation. Burbules has achieved the very opposite of what he intended. Seeking objectivity in the virtue of reasonableness, he has fetishised reasonableness in and as its separation from the only place that it can know (the mistake of) its objectivity. As a fetish, reasonableness is absolutely un-reasonableness, yet as a fetish it appears to enjoy a life of its own. Reason’s diaspora is not as this fetish; its home, the home of its diaspora, its broken middle, is its re-presentation, or (speculative) philosophy.

ETHICS (NODDINGS)

Nel Noddings has written an influential study of the relationship in teaching between the ‘one-caring’ and the ‘cared-for’. For those unfamiliar with Noddings’ ethical ideal of caring, I will offer a short summary. At root, her thesis is that human existence is universally characterised by the need to be cared-for and to be the one-caring. The
fundamental human characteristic therefore is ‘relatedness’ (Noddings, 2003, p. 49). The truth of this relatedness is care. From this grounding Noddings offers several key features of the structure or ‘the logic’ (p. 67) of the ‘concept of caring’ (ibid.). Caring is a natural capacity associated most closely with mothering. It is not a moral principle and can, therefore, preserve the uniqueness of human encounters. The appropriate mode of consciousness for caring is neither rational abstraction not merely emotion. It is rather the reflective consciousness of the ‘subjective aspect of experience’ (p. 132) in which we are ‘aware of ourselves feeling’ (ibid.). Against existential anguish where the obligation to relate may be incompatible with a view of existence as solitary, Noddings argues for joy as the recognition, the knowing, of ‘the actual or possible caring in relation’ (p. 134). This pleasure is the motive wherein the categorical imperative makes itself known; not now as heterogeneous moral principle, but as the fulfilment in relation of each person.

Noddings is critical of Kant. His ‘I must’ (or the Sollen) is present, she says, as duty, whereas the ‘I must’ of caring is present in love and is not, therefore, an imposition from outside. Where Kant’s Sollen is principled, Noddings’ Sollen is sentiment. I have argued above that this reading of Kant suppresses the aporetic nature of the categorical imperative. It is certainly worth adding here that such a view overlooks both the reasons why Kant felt the need to write a third Critique, and the nature of reflective judgements he describes there. Nevertheless it is not with Kant that I want to explore Noddings’ project here.

The subjective and affective ‘I must’ that Noddings offers has the significance of being ‘the Good’. When one self is in a caring relation to another, this is ‘the natural state that we inevitably identify as good. This goodness is felt, and it guides our thinking implicitly’ (p. 49). The relation between this actual self and the ideal ethical self, which is itself known in the relation to another, is where caring is fulfilled and becomes our guide for moral action. We should act in such a way as always to enhance this ethical ideal. As we will see in a minute, Noddings’ failure to recognise the tripartite structure of this experience has important implications overall for the project.

There is a logic, too, within the concept of care in regard to the participants whose ethical relation is that of care. ‘A caring relation requires the engrossing and motivational displacement of the one-caring, and it requires the recognition and spontaneous response of the cared-for’ (p. 78). The latter may be an infant who responds to its mother’s care, or a student who responds creatively to a task set by a teacher. The only universal here is the maintenance of the caring relation, although how this is to be done can be determined only within each different situation that arises. There is, however, always an idea of reciprocity in the ideal concept of care. ‘Caring involves two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. It is complete when it is fulfilled in both’ (p. 68). Caring, then, is ‘dependent on the other’ (p. 69) who is close at hand. As such, there is a pragmatism to the care relationship. Noddings argues that ‘we are not obliged to summon the “I must” if there is no possibility of completion in
the other. I am not obliged to care for starving children in Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other . . . we limit our obligation by examining the possibility of completion’ (p. 86). As such, the one-caring ‘acknowledges her finitude with both sadness and relief. She cannot do everything . . .’ (p. 112).

We can note here that Noddings finds the ethical ideal in two related moral sentiments: ‘the natural sympathy human beings feel for each other and the longing to maintain, recapture or enhance our most caring and tender moments’ (p. 104). These two sentiments are the basis of morality and are the end of the ethical ideal of care in seeking to realise and maintain itself. She concludes that ‘to receive and to be received, to care and be cared-for; these are the basic realities of human being and its basic aims’ (p. 173).

In regard to the teacher–student relationship care is admittedly one-sided. The one-caring, the teacher, can influence the student, in Buber’s sense, by presenting the effective world to him.11 This means the teacher must not shy away from teaching what the teacher judges to be important, but with the proviso that the student be kept aware that ‘he is more important, more valuable, than the subject’ (p. 174). However, Noddings also remarks that in doing so, the teacher’s power is ‘awesome’ (p. 176). This power is ethical when practising Buber’s notion of inclusion such that ‘the teacher receives the student and becomes in effect a duality’ (p. 177). She receives and adapts the student’s own feelings but the student should not also practise inclusion. As we will see later, in Chapter 5, such mutuality for Buber is acceptable for friends but not between teacher and student. There is a cooperation in the teacher–student relation characterised by care—otherwise the teacher would give but not receive. What the teacher does receive from the non-inclusive student is cooperation with the task set. The natural reward of teaching ‘is always found in the responsiveness of the student’ (p. 182).

Of necessity this is only a brief summary of the ethic of care. I want now to offer three related critiques—political, spiritual and philosophical—of Noddings’ model.

First, her ethic of care is, ironically, a morality of persons in civil society. Implicit in Noddings’ model is a formal reciprocity between the two who, ideally, become one duality. But the two who are equal are equal in terms of property rights, or as persons. They are equal as masters who have suppressed the philosophical relation of dependence, or again, philosophically, the aspect of themselves as servants.12 Noddings might argue here that such a political critique is the view of the masculine in the market place rather than the feminine, perhaps the mother at home and in a caring relationship to her child. Noddings is concerned to make ‘the voice of the mother heard in both ethics and education’ (p. 182). Rousseau provides an interesting challenge to Noddings. His view of human nature is embedded the idea of *amour de soi*, that is, as self-love, and in sympathy for the sufferings of others. Much of Noddings’ ethics of care is contained here. Rousseau’s natural man must care for himself and will care for others. However, his care for self carries no imperative to care for
others who are not suffering. Indeed, they will be of no interest to him. Noddings tries to emulate Rousseau’s reasoning here by making the imperative of care both selfish and mutual. Care is selfish because it aims at the joy of its ideal existence. It is practical because each act of such selfishness requires care for the other. ‘Caring is, thus, both self-serving and other-serving’ (p. 99).

But Rousseau’s Emile only learns this second lesson in civil society when it comes to the need to trade. What is given and received here is self-love in the form of objects that can be traded. Self-love can only offer itself in the unequal mutuality of the market place. It is significant, therefore, that the spheres in which the ethic of care can apply are fundamentally unequal. The mother receives reward for her giving care to the child in the ‘spontaneous delight and happy growth before her eyes that the caring has been received’ (p. 181). But like the student’s relation to the teacher, this care lacks the very criterion upon which the ethic of care has been based, namely, that it is complete ‘when it is fulfilled in both’ (p. 68). Noddings’ ethic of care does not survive the transition of the relation of the one-caring and the cared-for into the civil sphere precisely because there it is forced to suppress its inequality. Care in parenting and schooling is power, and is recognised as such in the one-sidedness of those relationships. Care in civil society is the power of market relations, but is misrecognised as equality in the formal mutuality between persons.

How do we know that care is present but unfulfilled in civil society? The answer is because its application, its practice, is contradictory and produces oppositions in our experience between universal and particular. It is here then that we have to look for our second critique of the ethic of care.

To be effective in the political sphere care is required to work against its formal assimilation into the market. To work against this corruption into particular interests it has first to recognise its fate within the opposition of universal and particular. It is a fate recognised but elided by Noddings. She comments that ‘individuality is defined in a set of relations’ (p. 51). This, of course, is true, but it is not by relations of our own choosing. Even the category of one individual person who meets or encounters another is defined in and by modern bourgeois property relations. The nature of the encounter is pre-determined. If it looks natural, that appearance is a key feature of its pre-determination. We saw above how Noddings chooses pragmatism over politics when she required care to be face-to-face. She acknowledges that a universal of caring is not possible because of its inevitable incompleteness, and notes that if it were to be completed in some way it could only be achieved by abandoning the proximal caring that faces one. This contradiction between caring for the one and caring for the all is the fate of care in modernity. Indeed, it is the modern experience of care. Derrida, in The Gift of Death (1995), notes that care develops into an economy of calculation where the care for one is already the sacrifice of another, or tens of millions of others. The inequality of care is played out but masked by ‘the smooth functioning’ (Derrida, 1995, p. 86) of society’s
‘economic, political and legal affairs’ (ibid.) wherein it enables ‘the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself’ (ibid.). Noddings may argue that if care were the basis of human relations this would not happen. The point, however, is that care for oneself and for others is the basis of human relations, and this is what happens.

The second point to be made here, then, concerns spirit. Noddings eschews the metaphysical or the transcendental as having any role to play in the ethical relations of care. On the one hand, they represent abstractions that take the side of moral principles against the concrete cases of care in face-to-face relations. Against this, Noddings says ‘women have been especially fortunate in their opportunities to celebrate the repetitions of ordinary life and thus achieve a balance between being and doing’ (Noddings, 2003, p. 130). She takes this argument further. ‘What ethical need has woman for God?’ (p. 98), she asks, when ‘all the love and goodness commanded by such a God can be generated from the love and goodness found in the warmest and best human relations’ (p. 97). However, the metaphysical is suppressed by Noddings in the dualism that she finds at the heart of caring. ‘Caring’, we remember, ‘involves two parties: the one-caring and the one cared-for’ (p. 68). When care is fulfilled each becomes a duality of self and other, and is experienced as joy ‘focussed somewhere beyond both, in the relation or in a recognition of relatedness’ (p. 138). In other words, Noddings needs the third partner in the work in order to claim that the duality of care, the ‘good’ itself, is known and recognised, yet refuses this third partner any actuality. To suppress the third partner, as Noddings does at all points in her book, is to assert a duality that is not-known, and this is the contradiction wherein the transcendental resides, unnoticed and unrecognised as the philosophical education of the broken middle.

Although we can show here that Noddings misrecognises spirit in the Hegelian sense of the broken middle, i.e. as the contradictory experience of the I and the We, there is a different and third way to make this critique, one much more in line with the thrust of this opening chapter. What is extraordinary about Noddings’ caring relation is that it does not care enough about itself to become a philosophical education about relation. Yet there are occasions in Noddings when the relation of care is experienced. Noddings makes it very clear that care can be recognised and known as the good, and can be evaluated as ‘better than, superior to, other forms of relatedness’ (p. 83). There is, therefore, a philosophical experience that differentiates relation from itself. Our natural motive towards care is known as the \textit{Sollen}, and ‘arises directly and prior to consideration of what it is that I might do’ (p. 82). However, Noddings notes that this feeling often comes in the form of a conflict where the \textit{Sollen} opposes my desires. It is where the \textit{Sollen} ‘may be lost in a clamour of resistance’ (ibid.). In these circumstances, says Noddings, ‘a second sentiment is required’ (ibid.) where, despite my feelings towards the other, I reconfirm my commitment to my ideal ethical self. In the first instance our caring is natural; in the second instance it is ethical. The latter contains a choice; ‘we may accept what we feel, or we may reject it’ (p. 83).
other words, we have here a relation between the natural feeling of obligation to another and the ethical decision to confirm an obligation to the other.

For Noddings, the ethical is not a principle, it is an ideal, and as such it can motivate us internally toward the external rather than come from outside and be imposed on the inner. But it is this relation between nature and ethics, inner and outer, freedom and necessity, which Noddings does not care enough about. These are well-rehearsed antinomies. It does not matter that Noddings argues that the ethical is only a reflective mode of the natural relation of care. The point is that care itself becomes an object of that reflection. Noddings is clear that ‘the source of my obligation is the value I place on the relatedness of caring’ (p. 84). Why, then, is a value not placed upon the relation of thinking to the relation of care? Why is no value placed upon the relation of the relation of freedom to nature? Why does Noddings disallow a philosophical experience of resistance and opposition between universal and particular, one that would subsist in the question of how much we care about the concept of caring? It is in our philosophical experience that the model of reciprocity is not itself, but our self-consciousness is never granted the opportunity to be the one-caring about relation and the relation that is cared-for. It may be of no interest to Noddings to pursue such thoughts; she may see them as male abstractions from concrete female realities. But this is to suppress the experience of relation that is, by her own logic, part of how we come to know the ethical. Noddings releases herself from philosophical experience by claiming that all moral decisions can be judged on the extent to which they develop care, either naturally or ethically. But she has nothing to say to the person who experiences care as an aporia. In the political sphere, as we saw above, the ethical is also unethical. This dilemma offers a philosophical education to those who care enough about ‘the logic of [the] concept of caring’ (p. 67) to sustain a relation to the relation, or to the way caring makes itself known ethically.

It is, then, in philosophy as the care of care that the relation contains and repeats the educational import that Noddings seeks for it. She admits to a ‘dialectic between thinking and feeling’ (p. 186) but not to the third partner for whom their relation is formative. Indeed, this third partner, the work and result of philosophical and natural experience, is suppressed by Noddings in two ways. First, she argues that the dialectic will perform ‘a continuing spiral’ (ibid.) through thought and feeling. But spirals, although attractive in terms of progress or development, are illusory in terms of experience. Spirals try to repeat educational movement but in fact, lacking re-cognition of their mis-recognition, they are never known at all. The spiral never learns of itself (as aporia) for it is never allowed its own return. Spirals in curricula or education in general are not a model of education that can be known philosophically except as a misrepresentation of the relation between education and philosophy.

Second, she posits the third partner as beyond dualism. Caring, as we saw a moment ago, involves two parties: ‘the one-caring and the one cared-for. It is complete when it is fulfilled in both’ (p. 68). Where she
does acknowledge joy as the recognition of relatedness (ethics) or in the relation itself (nature), she nevertheless asserts that this thought/feeling is ‘somewhere beyond both’ (p. 138) in ‘a world of relation’ (p. 140). Here the how and where of the relation of care is posited as a beyond, and as another new ethics that resolves the aporia of the ethical. It becomes, therefore, a further domination of the knowing of relation in philosophy and education. If care is relation, then one must care for relation in all its forms, including that in which the claim of the truth of care is asserted.

The significance of this can now be brought out in Noddings’ working of the teacher–student relationship where, I hold, it fails to realise a philosophy of the teacher. We noted earlier that Noddings acknowledged the awesome power of the teacher. But this power is not itself ever made the subject of the teacher’s experience or, more centrally, of her doubts. Rather, the power of the teacher is mediated by the response of the student. As the teacher selects aspects of the effective world to present to the student, so the teacher’s judgements are deemed appropriate or inappropriate by their reception in and by the student. ‘The special gift of the teacher, then, is to receive the student, to look at the subject matter with him . . . The teacher works with the student. He becomes her apprentice and gradually assumes greater responsibility in the tasks they undertake’ (pp. 177–178). The teacher nurtures the ethical ideal in establishing the relation of the one-caring and the one cared-for, and works cooperatively with the student ‘in his struggle toward competence in that world’ (p. 178).

The students’ struggles are acknowledged here but not the teacher’s. Who is to care for the teacher in her struggle effectively to select the world for the student? Who is to receive the dilemmas of the teacher as one-caring? Who is to confirm her? Noddings is clear that when the relation of one-caring is received by the student then the teacher will be confirmed. But, in what follows in this book, we will be approaching the philosophy of the teacher from the opposite direction. Who will confirm the teacher in her dilemmas and her failures, and in the struggle to care that, from the students’ point of view, is so often received as domination? It is here that the merely dualistic model in Noddings deserts teachers in their hours of need. ‘If the cared-for perceives the attitude [of caring] and denies it, then he is in an internal state of untruth’ (p. 181). Quite so, and even more the case that the teachers are often perceived ‘as the enemy’ (ibid.). The philosophy of the teacher begins here, in the dilemma that issues from the unequal and asymmetrical relation between teacher and student. It retrieves the inequality of the relation as of philosophical and educational significance: philosophical because the relation is the experience of the teacher as negative; and educational because the relation is also the experience of the teacher as learner. This is an experience that the teacher, in relation to the student as also in relation to herself, is participating in as her own formative work. Here, then, in the philosophy of the teacher as it will be revealed in what follows, it is the teacher who is now in relation to the teacher/student relation. This is her philosophical education. It does
not rest in a duality of mutual care. It negates all such identities by placing them, as objects, into relation with thought. As such, the struggles of the teacher reveal an import to her work and identity long before any talk of mutuality becomes possible. Mutuality is revealed not to be the truth of the teacher/student relation. If care for the other is our natural motivation to teach, the philosophy of the teacher begins with the negation, the doubt, the reality of that relation. It is also the negation therein of the ideal of the ethical. In the philosophy of the teacher the ethical, too, is brought into knowing as the relation of the relation. The ethical also collapses. Surely, a teacher might ask, we cannot afford to lose the vision and the hope that the ideal of the ethical carries. Perhaps, but even more urgently teaching cannot afford the luxury of releasing the ethical from its determination in and by modern social relations. Only when the ethical is experienced as participating within its own antithesis can it be comprehended as spirit, or as philosophy and education. The education of others requires teachers to commit to their own philosophical education, and to work within the contradictions it creates for them.

**NOTES**

1. This coexistence is explored below in Chapter 6.
2. Rose argues in particular that sociology took upon itself the task of healing the rift between ethics and law (Rose, 1981, Chapter 1).
3. This has also been described in Tubbs and Grimes, 2001.
4. In a longer account of these developments, Janice Grimes and I have made reference to the study of Kant on the course. I have omitted reference to him here to ensure continuity in the argument being presented.
5. I will have more to say on this in the following chapter.
8. This re-works that famous formulation of the dialectic of enlightenment, that myth is already enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to myth; see Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979, p. xvi.
9. Rousseau describes *amour-propre* as a love of esteem in public opinion, a desire that perpetuates itself in the dissimulation of a ‘uniform and deceitful veil of politeness’ (Rousseau, 1973, pp 6). Burbules, therefore, does not want to see reasonableness as merely the dissimulation of civil society, but as a truer and more generalisable type of human quality.
10. I have explored the relation of the third *Critique* to the other *Critiques* in Tubbs, 2004, Chapter 1.
11. Buber’s work is the subject of a more detailed account below in Chapter 5.
12. It is in terms of this relation of master and servant that the philosophy of the teacher will be expounded below.