Chapter 7
Nietzsche, Zarathustra and Deleuze

INTRODUCTION

Gilles Deleuze confronts many of the concepts and ways of philosophising that have come to characterise philosophy. In doing so, he demands attention to the changes in thinking that he commends. This makes a straightforward description of his ideas deliberately troubling. Brian Massumi, writing recently about Deleuze, has also to confront his writing about writing about Deleuze. Half-way through his article Massumi confesses:

my deadline is months past. My word-limit is fast approaching. And still no ‘results’, by the standard I set for myself beforehand: reader-friendliness; coverage; comparative breadth; no false leads and loose ends; a demonstration of my ‘expertise’ that met these goals yet didn’t betray ‘my’ philosophy . . . (Massumi, 1998, p. 568).

He comments further on the pain and joy that living with Deleuze’s philosophy demands for him:

My stomach anticipated this failure with a wrenching I felt for weeks before sitting down to write. An excruciating ache in my jaws bears witness to the grinding tension that wracks my body when I try to write as a ‘Deleuzian’ ‘about’ Deleuze . . . I enjoy this, intensely. I enjoy this, to exhaustion. I would leave my home and my job and move to the other end of the earth to have more time to luxuriate in this feeling (ibid.).

The paradox here, for Massumi, is that whilst becoming Deleuzian is ‘liberating the blockage in oneself’ (ibid.), which in turn ‘is to surrender to openness’ (ibid.), nevertheless he is still forced into ‘dissection for . . . academic debate’ (p. 559), something that offends what Massumi himself calls Deleuze’s ‘pedagogy of the concept’ (p. 568).

Mindful of such difficulties, I need to perform my own dissection of Deleuze’s philosophy as I think it pertains to the teacher, and most notably to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as teacher. This chapter, then, first describes some of the ideas in Deleuze, notably that of imperceptibility, that are needed to understand what kind of a philosophical teacher his philosophy suggests, if any. These ideas are then read against themselves, through Zarathustra and Nietzsche, before returning to a different conception of the imperceptible. I will make two criticisms of Deleuze: first, that his rhizomatic scheme has to employ the very kind of speculative education that he eschews; and second, that Nietzsche and Zarathustra sustain a very different kind of imperceptibility to that posited by Deleuze.
THE SCHEMA OF THE RHIZOME

I understand the multiplicity identified to be the man Deleuze to be arguing that subjectivity is not what it appears to be. None of us are how we appear to be, either to ourselves or to others. There are processes at work, operating behind our backs as it were, which cannot be seen in the same way as other objects. And yet, in order to come to know these hidden movements, it is not necessary to guess at or hope for any kind of a priori transcendental conceptions which would offer the possibility for knowing these movements and giving them meaning. In this sense, one can, perhaps surprisingly, proceed empirically, for coming to know these movements requires only that they be seen as happening. They do not need to be classified; all that is required is that one comes to know them.

On the other hand, to know subjectivity is to have been given a face. Deleuze argues that such subjectivities are always pinned against the wall of dominant significations, we are always sunk in the hole of our subjectivity, the black hole of our Ego which is more dear to us than anything. A wall on which are inscribed all the objective determinations which fix us, put us into a grille, identify us and make us recognised, a hole where we deposit—together with our consciousness—our feelings, our passions, our little secrets (Deleuze, 2002, p. 45).

We have to ‘unmake the face’ (ibid.). But how can we liberate ourselves from this black hole of identity, from the face? How can we get ‘past the wall while avoiding bouncing back on it, behind, or being crushed?’ (p. 46). Would not this escape leave us ‘imperceptible?’ Indeed, even though this unmaking of the face would be carried out in the open, it is, says Deleuze, ‘we who have become a secret, it is we who are hidden’. It is the case that ‘when you no longer have anything to hide’, this is when ‘no one can grasp you’ for you have become imperceptible (ibid.). They do not know who you are without the face.

What is this imperceptibility? What is it, this secret, wherein one has, says Deleuze, become ‘identical’ (ibid.), which wears no face, and that is not a subject but is a secret precisely because it no longer has anything to hide? This is the question we will now explore.

But where can one begin this questioning? Not in the face-to-face, for the face is an answer to a different question; it answers the question ‘Who are you?’, but our question is ‘Where to begin?’ But, Deleuze would suggest, is not the question the becoming of the question? Are we not already in the middle of what can be termed the question-becoming? The hyphen here is essential to Deleuze in constructing his distinctive philosophy. It links former identities, or faces, to a process of becoming wherein they can be called multiplicities. This will be explored further in a moment. For Deleuze, we are always ‘in the middle of something’ (pp. 28, 113). At first it may not be obvious that this is the case, for there is machinery at work, or powers at work, which need ‘to overcode the whole body and head with a face’ (p. 18). For example, there is the binary
machinery of segmentation. These machines are lines of power that form us within dualisms—man/woman, child/adult, black/white and so on. In addition, as it shapes our lives into these defined segments, so the different segments collide and cut across each other, offering further binary choices that were not present on the first line. Power as segmentation here does not overcome dualism, for even its ‘choices’ are binary. In addition, lines of segmentation determine their own codes, but they are all overcoded by the power of the state apparatus which ‘organises the dominant utterances and the established order of a society, the dominant languages and knowledge, conformist actions and feelings, [and] the segments which prevail over the others’ (p. 129). Finally, the rigidity of the lines of segmentation organises the formation of subjects within them.

Segmentation, then, is anything but imperceptibility. It is along these lines of power that we are identifiable and identified. The harmonisation of the form of the segment is, says Deleuze, ‘the education of the subject’ (p. 130) into who he or she is. But if we find ourselves between lines of segmentation, for example, between family and work, or between child and adult, or between black and white, and then find ourselves between other segments such as Afro-Caribbean and British, or father and teacher, or pupil and adolescent, what are these ‘betweens’? For Deleuze, they are different forms of powers. They deterritorialise the boundaries of the segments, and are experienced by us as betweens. These fluxes shake the territories of segments; they cross thresholds but do not cross into other segments. Where the binary machine fixed the subject for identification, here, in the between, there is only movement or becoming.

It is important to note here that, for Deleuze, the flux of betweens is not part of the segments. It is independent of them. As such, ‘losing’ one’s subjectivity to imperceptibility is not a lack or a loss of identity, not a negation. This is one of the most significant elements in Deleuzian philosophy which, for Deleuze, distinguishes it from Hegel and the whole paradigm of negativity within consciousness. It would only be a loss if overcoding was taken as subjectivity. But the deterritorialisation of such a concept of subjectivity comes from outside. It is to be known, therefore, not only differently but as the difference itself. We might say here that the different from being is becoming. Becoming is not known in relation to being; it is known as different from being and as difference per se. In Deleuze’s terms, it is a plane of immanence ‘proceeding by thresholds, constituting becomings, blocs of becoming, marking continuums of intensity, combinations of fluxes’ (p. 130). Furthermore, these molecular lines, as they are called by Deleuze, make the ‘fluxes of deterritorialisation shoot between the segments’ (p. 131). They are only ‘relationships of speed and slowness’ (p. 130). They are fluxes that do not belong to the binaries or to the segments. Deterritorialisation is not a matter of synthesis

but of a third which always comes from elsewhere and disturbs the binarity of the two . . . It is not a matter of adding a new segment on to the preceding segments on the line . . . but of tracing another line in the
middle of the segmentary line, in the middle of the segments, which carries them off according to the variable speeds and slownesses in a movement of flight or of flux (p. 131).

This line of flight is the third line of power. It is the line of gravity for it carries us across segments and thresholds, and it is the line of velocity for it registers as intensity, be it slow or fast. Together the three lines constitute all becomings. But those people who only have segment and flux, only territory and threshold, are still perceptible. They are in a middle but still related to the binaries. Here, deterritorialisation is an unhappy consciousness. For Deleuze, only those who learn to fly and to travel to unknown destinations, only they are the joy of the becoming, and are imperceptible.

Let us try this again, slightly differently. The question asked was: where we might begin to know ourselves without faces? The answer, seen above, is along the lines of segmentation, flux and flight. However, Deleuze sees that it is more likely that one will not seek the answer to this question from within the intersecting of lines and flights. It is more likely that one will try to start at beginnings which do not in fact exist. For Deleuze there is no beginning, for even the idea of a beginning is a middle. Philosophy, he argues, when it has thought in terms of beginnings and ends, has employed the tree model of philosophy. The French, he says, ‘think in terms of trees too much’ (p. 39). A tree can begin by putting down roots. The roots enable it to grow. The tree, therefore, is a whole from start to finish. Grass, however, is the deterritorialised tree. Grass grows in the middle of paving stones. It is unrelated to the paving stones, yet it marks their territory by growing through their thresholds. It grows between segments but is unrelated to them. It grows through fissures and cracks but does not put down roots. Quoting Henry Miller, Deleuze states, ‘grass only exists between the great non-cultivated spaces. It fills in the voids. It grows between—among the other things’ (p. 30). Philosophy that is tree-bound in its structure crushes the grass with its binary machines and its segments. One has to ‘set about opposing the rhizome to trees. And trees are not a metaphor at all, but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole apparatus that is planted in thought in order to make it go in a straight line and produce the famous correct ideas’ (p. 25). Grass is experimentation, for in the middle there is not an average, or any kind of amelioration. The intensity of the middle is its line of flight and its speed. Its movement ‘does not go from one point to another—rather it happens between two levels as in a difference of potential’ (p. 31). The intensity that is this difference ‘produces a phenomenon, releases or ejects it, sends it into space’ (ibid.). Thus absolute speed and flight has content not as the reconciliation of dualism but as a multiplicity or an assemblage. Like grass it is a clump but without roots, existing only in the middle. This multiplicity is an assemblage of lines and flights. It is nomadic. It is grass and speed.
Philosophy must then face the deterritorialisation of its face. Multiplicities are ideas; to know multiplicities as ideas is to grow through the spaces left by trees and to fly between and across thresholds. There is no *a priori* here to act as a root for this rhizomatic thinking. In the middle, ‘concepts are exactly like sounds, colours, or images, they are intensities which suit you or not, which are acceptable or aren’t acceptable’ (p. 4). This is not a matter of identity but of style, not of probabilities but of chance combinations. This is not the overcoming of dualisms, or even the recognition of each in the other. It is primarily desire and the encounter of desire with proper names, where the encounter is effect but not subject or person. In the becoming-effect of middles and flights, ‘it is not one term which becomes the other, but each encounters the other, a single becoming which is not common to the two, since they have nothing to do with one another, but which is between the two’ (pp. 6–7). Deleuze has us call this encounter a double capture, one not realising couples but expressing nuptials between two reigns. As such, there is woman-becoming, man-becoming, revolution-becoming, where “‘what’ each becomes changes no less than “that which” becomes’ (p. 2), in an asymmetrical and a-parallel evolution. ‘Nuptials without couples’ (p. 8); ‘becomings without history’ (p. viii); ‘individuation without subject’ (ibid.); thought ‘without image’ (p. 24).

Where, we might ask now, are philosophy’s intensities, flights, assemblages, multiplicities and chances? Deleuze argues that they are in the AND that is between elements or segments.1 ‘Even if there are only two terms, there is an AND between the two, which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but which constitutes the multiplicity’ (pp. 34–35). Moreover, this AND, which carries on *ad infinitum*, is the stuttering in one’s own language; it is that from within which is the flight, the speed and the repetition of chance and combination. For Deleuze, then, this stammering is the opening of experimentation, of life lived in the middle without roots, without representation, but with grass and speed.

Rhizomatic thinking encompasses desire and style. Desire is immanent in thinking. Its objectivity is flux (p. 78). It is the manufacture of the unconscious, for it gets it flowing. Psychoanalysis, says Deleuze, beats down the connections and assemblages of desire, for it treats each instance as the structure of the whole. In fact, desire is the ‘raw material to experiment with’. It is not ‘internal to a subject, any more than it tends towards an object; it is strictly immanent to a plane which it does not pre-exist, to a plane which must be constructed, where particles are emitted and fluxes combine’ (p. 89). In other words, desire is where ‘someone is deprived of the power of saying “I”’ (ibid.). But this is not a negation or a lack of something; the grass does not lack the paving stones that it grows through. Grass, or that which grows in the middle, does not grow because it lacks something; it grows as its own positive plane of desire, albeit in the cracks which appear in social organisation. Desire is already intensity, but ‘you haven’t got it’ (p. 90) if you do not know how to construct it in assemblages and fluxes. ‘It is created all alone, but know how to see it . . .
You have to create it, know how to create it, take the right directions, at your risk and peril’ (p. 91). Deleuze’s mentor, Zarathustra, might say: ‘not lack I tell you, but will to power’; or Deleuze: not identity but ‘hecceity’—that is, events and intensities of affects, of combinations of movements and fluxes, and which are ‘always in-between’ (p. 93). ‘Do you realise’, Deleuze asks, ‘how simple a desire is? Sleeping is a desire. Walking is a desire. Listening to music, or making music, or writing, are desires. A spring, a winter, are desires. Old age is a desire. Even death. Desire never needs interpreting, it is it which experiments’ (p. 95).

But if desire is released from ‘lack’, does this not assume a state of nature? Deleuze has anticipated this question. ‘We say quite the opposite: desire only exists when assembled or machined’ (p. 96). Nevertheless, is not the existence of suffering evidence of a lack? Again no, because even suffering is a becoming; even suffering is desire. How then should one treat suffering? As another ‘in-between’, which is again the affirmation of chance and one multiplicity among an infinity of multiplicities. Suffering without image is affirmative of one’s own becoming-suffering whilst, in the more traditional philosophical sense, suffering with image, with representation, is both the lack or negation of a fixed segment or territory, and it is not becoming-suffering but only resentment and bitterness at one’s lot, measured against an ideal and fixed image of what ought to be.

Desire, for Deleuze, is, therefore, not separate from its assemblage for it is the assemblage. It is not spontaneous; it is made on the plane which makes it possible. Desire is not about drives but about assembly and the creation of itself in assemblage. How then do we live the imperceptible? How do we live as desire and in positivity rather than in the melancholic sadness of the priests who know desire only as a lack?

Here Zarathustra is Deleuze’s exemplar. To live in the middle ‘all that is important is that each group or individual should construct the plane of immanence on which they lead their life and carry on their business. Without these conditions you obviously do lack something, but you lack precisely the conditions which make a desire possible’ (p. 96). In constructing this plane of immanence one is in the movement of becoming, for becomings ‘are acts which can only be contained in a life and expressed in a style’ (p. 3). Style is, therefore, ‘a right to desire’ (p. 147).

This stylising of life as becoming is what Deleuze intends by the idea of living as imperceptible or as without the face by which one is pinned to the wall of identity. It is where one becomes identical only to a secret. We are to think of Kierkegaard and the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling. This knight, observes Deleuze, is interested only in movement. He is in this sense one step on from the knight of infinite resignation. The latter is resigned to the impossibility of a unification between the infinite and the finite. The former, on the other hand, the knight of faith, has taken the leap from resignation to faith. This leap, however, does not distinguish the knight of faith from the crowd. Quite the contrary:

he does not make himself obvious, he resembles rather a bourgeois, a tax-collector, a tradesman, he dances with so much precision that they say he
is only walking or even staying still, he blends into the wall but the wall has become alive... There is now only an abstract line, a pure movement which is difficult to discover, he never begins, he takes things by the middle, he is always in the middle... (p. 127). 

The imperceptible man is the becoming-man, as he is the becoming-of all his fluxes. Here life in the middle is style; style is the between of social segments; style is the grass between the paving stones; and style is rhizomatic, without roots; style is multiplicity and style is becoming-imperceptible. It is the unfacing of the person who can affirm desire as his own becoming.

Here is not just a stoicism regarding life’s hardships and struggles; here in addition is their affirmation. ‘What affects are you capable of? Experiment...’ (p. 61). It is ‘not easy’ (p. 62) to be a free man for all around there are vampires, tyrants and priests, ‘captors of souls’ (p. 61), who ‘have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us’ (ibid.). They do not rest until they have transmitted to us ‘their neurosis and their anxiety, their beloved castration [and their] resentment against life’ (p. 62). But the soul, for Deleuze, demands that we experiment, that we become-experiment so that one may become ‘the child of one’s own events’ (p. 65). And should one be injured, for example, on the battlefield, then one affirms ‘my wound existed before me, I was born to embody it! Amor fati, to want the event’; indeed, for Deleuze, it means to extract from actions the ‘immaculate part’ that goes beyond mere accomplishment, even to ‘a love of life which can say yes to death’ (ibid.). The new categorical imperative will be ‘give way to rhizomatic movements’ (p. 67). Here is the post-structural multiplicity that, as subject, is become-deterritorialised. Here, as Deleuze tells us in Nietzsche and Philosophy, is Zarathustra, for whom ‘I will’ is ‘I am’.

DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION CONTRA HEGEL

In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze claims that there can be ‘no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche’ (Deleuze, 1983, p. 195). Later, in Difference and Repetition, he affirms his philosophy of affirmation as part of ‘a generalized anti-Hegelianism’ that includes ontology, structuralism and the discovery of ‘fields of a power peculiar to repetition... [in] the unconscious, language and art’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. xix). Central to this thesis are his observations that

difference and repetition have taken the place of the identical and the negative, of identity and contradiction. For difference implies the negative, and allows itself to lead to contradiction, only to the extent that its subordination to the identical is maintained. The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation (ibid.).

Deleuze stakes himself in the claim that ‘modern thought is born from the failure of representation, of the loss of identities’ and of the collapse of
representation into simulacra. Identity is only simulated, ‘produced as an optical “effect”’ by the more profound game of difference and repetition’ (ibid.). The continued subjection of difference to the identity, or to the concept of the same, ‘seems’ (p. 262) to mean that difference only becomes thinkable ‘when tamed’ by the four ‘iron collars of representation’, namely: identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance (ibid.). Even, or especially, in Hegel where difference is pushed ‘to the limit’ (p. 263), the path is ‘a dead end’ (ibid.) which ultimately brings it back to identity—the very condition upon which the examination of difference was allowed to proceed. Thus, representation is ‘a site of transcendental illusion’ (p. 265) which takes four interrelated forms of the subordination of difference: under the identity of the concept, under resemblance, under the negative and under the analogy of judgement. If Hegel is the high point of the history of a ‘long perversion’ (p. 164), then ‘something completely new begins with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’, a ‘theatre within philosophy’ in which the ultimately static concept of mediation is replaced by ‘movement’ which can affect the mind ‘outside of all representations’. Finding such ‘immediate acts’ is, therefore, for Kierkegaard and Nietzsche ‘a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate representations; of inventing vibrations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind’. In doing so, they created simultaneously a ‘theatre of the future and a new philosophy’ (p. 8).

Leading directly from his presentation of affirmation in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze reaffirms in *Difference and Repetition* that ‘representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference’ (p. 55). ‘Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, but mobilises and moves nothing’ (pp. 55–56). Hegelian movement can only represent ‘the universal’ to ‘everyone’ (p. 52). But ‘there is always an unrepresented singularity who does not recognise precisely because it is not everyone or the universal’. This singularity, who is spoken for does not follow the Hegelian process of synthesis. Rather this ‘sensitive conscience’ subsists in its immediacy, in its difference which itself constitutes the true movement. Difference is the true content of the thesis, the persistence of the thesis. The negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the phantom or the epiphenomenon. The whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology (ibid.).

Where representation offers only the indeterminate or negation, the philosophy of difference affirms itself in the refusal of these pseudo-alternatives. The affirmation of difference is its own essence. This is unlike the yes-saying that agrees to bear difference in order to cleanse it of its negativity. Such asceticism suffers in order to ‘deliver difference up to the identical’ (p. 53). On the contrary, the affirmation of difference is to deny ‘everything which can be denied and must be denied’ (p. 55). It is

Nietzsche’s new categorical imperative: deny everything ‘which cannot pass the test of eternal return’. Those who do not ‘believe’ in eternal return will affirm for themselves the epiphenomenon of abstract knowledge. But for those who can deny negative representation, those who can affirm difference in itself, this will ensure that the negative ‘consumes itself at the mobile centre of eternal return. For if eternal return is a circle, then difference is at the centre and the same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentralised, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal’. Affirmation has difference as its object, and, therefore, affirmation is multiple. It is difference in itself. Negation is also difference ‘but seen from below’. When we put or leave affirmation in the undetermined, we also put ‘determination in the negative’. Negation, therefore, is only ‘the shadow of the more profound genetic element—of that power or “will” which engenders the affirmation and the difference of affirmation’. Or, put more simply, negation is a form of ressentiment against power, for rather than affirming difference, it offers only epiphenomena as reality. ‘Those who bear the negative know not what they do: they take the shadow for reality, they encourage phantoms, they uncouple consequences from premisses . . .’ (ibid.).

Is this idea, which ‘knows nothing of negation’ (p. 207), in fact, the beautiful soul, or, ‘differences, nothing but differences, in a peaceful coexistence in the idea of social places and functions’? Deleuze says ‘the name of Marx is sufficient to save it from this danger’. Why? Because unlike Hegel, Marx, says Deleuze, knows the real movement of production to be differenciation—the division of labour—in a social multiplicity.3 Hegel, however, knows difference only as ‘opposition, contradiction and alienation’ (ibid.). The beautiful soul cannot form out of the power of differenciation for difference is affirmation, not merely melancholy. When difference then becomes the object of a corresponding affirmation, it releases ‘a power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul’ (p. xx). In this sense the negative is the shadow of a problem, and as such always ‘represents’ problems to consciousness as opposition. The negative here is difference without affirmation. Seen as ‘the wrath of the social idea’, however, revolution is affirmation as ‘the social power of difference’ (p. 208). Thus, says Deleuze, to be aware of negativity as shadow is already to know a second determination, that ‘the negative is the objective field of the false problem [and is] the fetish in person’. He concludes: ‘practical struggle never proceeds by way of the negative but by way of difference and its power of affirmation’ (ibid.).

The negative, as such, is illusion, or the shadow of problems, but not their imperative, their intensity or their differenciation. Contra the negative, then,

affirmation, understood as the affirmation of difference, is produced by the positivity of problems understood as differential posittings; multiple affirmation is produced by problematic multiplicity. It is of the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm difference. As for the negative, this is only the shadow cast upon the affirmations produced by a problem (p. 267).
We will return to Deleuze’s position on Kierkegaard in a moment. What is now required is to put this Deleuzian account of will to power and eternal return in opposition to a very different interpretation of Nietzsche.

**HEGEL’S ZARATHUSTRA**

I want now, breaking with this idiom, to retrieve the speculative significance of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra against Deleuze’s reading in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1983). I think it is correct to say that Deleuze sees Zarathustra as the imperceptible man of desire, and opposed to the man of ressentiment of the *Genealogy of Morals*. Ressentiment, he argues, acts to hinder and delay action. Its acts are designed to bring about the cessation of action. When reaction prevails over action, nihilism is to be found, a will to nothingness. It marks the triumph of non-act as value. Nietzsche calls this the slave revolt in (and as) morality. But for Deleuze, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra marks a transvaluation of all such values wherein a new freedom is released, a new way of feeling, thinking and above all being (1983, p. 71). This transvaluation is brought about through the completion of nihilism. If we know that will to power as negation or nihilism is only one form of will to power, only ‘one of its qualities’ (p. 172), then we are already thinking will to power differently. This marks a transvaluation from the knowledge of values to the value of knowledge, where will to power ‘teaches us that it is known to us in only one form’ (ibid.). Thus, we learn of will to power as intensity, multiplicity and desire. The man who achieves this transvaluation is, therefore, the man who can unface himself and live in ‘the eternal joy of becoming’ (p. 174). Only his ‘no’ affirms itself through the denial of negation, segment and identification. The reason this ‘no’ is not Hegel’s negative lies, for Deleuze, in eternal return. There is no return of the negative; rather, it is ‘the returning itself that constitutes being’ (p. 48). Deleuze, therefore, concludes that

Nietzsche’s speculative teaching is as follows: becoming, multiplicity and chance do not contain any negation; difference is pure affirmation; return is the being of difference excluding the whole of the negative . . . Nietzsche’s practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity, becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that only joy returns . . . The death of God needs time finally to find its essence and become a more joyful event . . . This time is the cycle of the eternal return (p. 190).

This theory and practice for Deleuze is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra-becoming.

What price then Hegel’s Zarathustra? This brings us to our first criticism of Deleuze. The contested territory between Hegel and Deleuze for Nietzsche’s ‘speculative’ teaching is the middle. For Deleuze the joy of becoming is always in the middle. For Hegel the middle is always broken and known in experience. For Deleuze becoming is not negation but
desire. For Hegel experience is the negation of desire because in experience is mediation as knowing. Where Deleuze affirms the middle, Hegel affirms and negates the broken middle. But, at this stage, it is appropriate to ask, what is our philosophical experience of their difference? How are we educated by and within the broken middle of such a dispute between Hegel and Deleuze? In Deleuze’s terms we can experience it as the affirmation not only of their difference but also as the becoming of our difference from them. Here, as the grass between them, our education is where will to power ‘teaches’ (p. 172) us to think. In denying the denial that Deleuze sees as Hegel’s negative, we instead free ourselves from the resentful ‘yes’ to all that is negative. In saying ‘no’ even to no itself, we are affirmed as difference.

But in order to differentiate difference from Hegel’s broken middle in this way, Deleuze is dependent upon a speculative concept of philosophy as education, the very type of concept that he criticises. This education is carried within the transvaluation of values and the overcoming of the negative that Deleuze argues for. There is a philosophy of education in Deleuze, but not, as I will argue, one which comprehends the philosophical and educational (speculative) relation between philosophy AND education. In Difference and Repetition he argues that learning is knowledge which allows it (knowledge) to be grasped positively (Deleuze, 1994, p. 64). Indeed, what Deleuze seems to be claiming here for learning is that it is an opening or a gap ‘which relates being and the question to one another’ (ibid.). The truth of learning here, in itself, is as an ‘apprenticeship’ (p. 164) which has two aspects, both of which are different from knowledge. The first is that the apprentice explores ideas ‘according to what one understands of a problem’ (p. 165) whereas ‘knowledge designates only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions’ (p. 164). The second is that the apprentice elevates the faculties into experiment and communication through and as multiplicities. It is the learning where culture is ‘an involuntary adventure, the movement of learning which links a sensibility, a memory and a thought’ (pp. 165–166). This is in contrast to learning as a method which presupposes ‘the innate right of knowledge to represent the entire transcendental realm’ (p. 166) and which therein ‘regulates the collaboration of all the faculties’ (p. 165).

Deleuze is critical of the model of apprenticeship found in Hegel. The philosopher has an apprentice, says Deleuze, in the way that a scientific researcher might have a lab rat in a maze. The former carries away the results, the knowledge, ‘in order to discover its transcendental principles’ (p. 166). Deleuze states ‘even in Hegel, the extraordinary apprenticeship which we find in the Phenomenology remains subordinated, with regard to its result no less than its principle, to the ideal of knowledge in the form of absolute knowledge’ (ibid.).

For a thinker who opposes eternal return to the dialectical reproduction of the same, however, for whom learning takes place ‘not in the relation between a representation and an action . . . but in the relation between a sign and a response’ (p. 22), Deleuze’s critique of Hegel is precisely a
reproduction of the same. It is a reproduction of the same abstract concept of truth and of education, used without thought to its presupposition, that Hegel bemoaned nearly two hundred years ago, and that we highlighted in the preceding chapter. The charge is that in Hegel philosophical education is subordinated to a preconceived totality of concepts. Yet to read Hegel in this way requires that Deleuze subordinate Hegelian philosophy to a preconceived totality of one concept in particular, that of education. The concept of education that Deleuze presupposing here is that learning is essentially open-ended. However, and this is the whole point, this idea of education is not open-ended enough to learn about itself—to have itself as form and content, to have itself as experience, to have its own truth according to itself as it participates in its own act. It becomes, therefore, another example of the suppression of education and philosophy because it is based upon a presupposition of that relation. The whole structure of Deleuzian philosophy that has been outlined above stands upon the presupposition of learning as difference, but it lacks the necessary corollary of the experience of learning as difference from itself. Every multiplicity, every plane of immanence, every pure difference is claimed as will to power teaching us to think. Yet how are we to know this as a teaching, and as a learning, if education per se is denied its own relation of difference and repetition? This goes to the very heart of the contested terrain between Deleuze and Hegel. Deleuze can claim the middle, the between, the AND, because it is posited as the unity (learning) that is pure difference. Hegel cannot claim the middle because in Hegel the relation, the broken middle, is the true, and the true made object to itself in and as philosophical education, whilst for Deleuze the relation is known without being known, that is, as the between. It is this positing, this prejudice of the formal equivalence as the end of culture that was marked out as characteristic of the bourgeois notion of culture in Part I above. It is this positing which enables Deleuze to occupy the becoming-middle ground without the loss of the middle to the relation that joins and separates them. In short, Deleuze can have the middle because he does not have a philosophical notion of the middle as its own education, or as the broken middle, in and as philosophy. I contest, therefore, that Deleuze is limited to a very interesting and detailed hermeneutical analysis of the relation of the middle in the ontological difference that is the question and the problematic. He fails, however, to let this hermeneutic be open to itself as its own truth, and fails thereby to have a philosophy of the middle at all. In consequence, and in comparison to the speculative conception of philosophy and education, we have in Deleuze merely learning without learning, education without education, and philosophy without philosophy.

THE WAR ON REPRESENTATION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

I will make this same critique now but related this time to a contribution from within the philosophy of education; namely a recent essay by Gordon
Bearn invoking the University of Beauty, a sympathetic but largely Deleuzian critique of Lyotard’s notion of the sublime. Lyotard knew, says Bearn, that Universities were ‘already becoming centres designed to improve the performance of the system by the delivery and discovery of information’ (Bearn, 2000, p. 231). He knew that this would put restraints on the forms of knowledge, of teaching, and of research, for only that which contributed to the efficient management of ‘the system’ (ibid.) would be deemed acceptable. Bearn notes that efficiency, under the guise of ‘development’ (p. 253), is behind the drive for greater use of the Internet and distance learning, the demand for greater independent learning by students, and the demand for greater flexibility in teaching methodologies. The drive for performativity lies behind each of these so-called innovations.

But Bearn is critical of Lyotard’s response to such institutional performativity. Lyotard, he argues, paints a ‘melancholic grey’ (p. 232) over the possibilities of resistance to such performativity. This is, he continues, because, where genres of discourse mask the differend that lies in the gap between phrases (where one such link, for example, would be that of the discourse of performativity), there is no way to retrieve the differend without the repetition of the exclusion, again, of the differend. Lyotard, says Bearn, turns here to a Kantian notion of the sublime. Here the experience of the sublime will register both the limits of the system and that which exceeds them: ‘In this way he hoped at one and the same time to acknowledge the inevitability of the system’s power and the ethical importance of what escapes, if only for a moment, the system’s grasp’ (p. 236).

Here Bearn argues that Lyotard was wrong to turn to a University of the Sublime rather than a University of Beauty. Lyotard searches for a way to witness the differend, the links between phrases, without employing genres of discourse that will occlude the differend. How, in other words, can we think without representation? Against the presentation (or is it representation?) of the sublime in Kant as a No to a representation of the infinite followed by a Yes as the sublime (re-)presentation of the infinite as the excess of any representation, Bearn finds in Lyotard a No followed by a second No, a double negation. Where the Yes in Kant is reason’s idea of the infinite beyond its being cognised, ‘Lyotard’s story never finds its Yes’ (p. 240). This is, says Bearn, because Lyotard fails to affirm life as ‘linking . . . in all its forms’ (ibid.). The first negation is of representation; the second negation is of desire itself. The blank, the abyss between phrases, the differend, is, therefore, defined only negatively as not this thought and not this living self. The nihilism of representation becomes in Lyotard nihilism per se: not-known and not-now. His response, says Bearn, is religious. The holy is invoked to ‘plug the holes’ (p. 242) that the nihilism of double negation has realised.

Bearn employs a Deleuzian form of affirmation to re-phrase Lyotard’s negative, even nihilistic, un-phrasing. Before exploring a little how Bearn does this, it is instructive to note why he does it. On the one hand, in response to Lyotard’s double negation, he asks, ‘why should we settle for
this? Is this not a failure of philosophical imagination?’ (ibid.). On the other hand, he states that Lyotard’s negation ‘needs to be supplemented by a positive affirmative account of what is beyond representation’ (p. 243). Why? Why the need for the affirmative? Why is representation seen as a failure? Assertions such as this, so often overlooked as commanding consensus, in fact reveal the misrecognition of philosophy within the culture of modern abstract reason, mis-recognition which is then imposed as a *sollen* (an ought). They are, in effect, misunderstandings of our abstract philosophical consciousness. As we have seen above in Parts I and II, and now in Part III, the philosophy of education appears unable and unwilling to recognise its own contingency within the culture of abstraction that it sets itself against. Who is the ‘we’ in Bearn’s question? Why does the negative need supplementing? The mistaken assumption is the same in both questions. The ‘we’ who do not have to settle for negation is the ‘we’ that is abstracted from the determination of its thought within modern social and political culture. This need and failure is not, therefore, a critique of our technical, instrumental and performative forms of theory and practice; it is a repetition of them without philosophical education. From within Hegelian rather than Deleuzian speculative philosophy, this repetition, realised as abstraction, is negative for the abstract consciousness that sees its perspective on itself changed. But for this consciousness that knows the change to itself as education, no supplement is required; nor is this merely a failure. Bluntly, the dissatisfaction with the education of our abstract philosophical consciousness and the call for supplementary affirmations amount to the point of view of abstraction itself. This is precisely how, for our purposes here, Deleuzian post-structuralism reproduces philosophy as further abstract domination. Its desire for affirmation—let us say, for a genuinely lived life which is not dominated by *ressentiment*—is the denial of its philosophical education in the name of affirmation.

In the war being waged on representation here, as elsewhere in educational theorising, Bearn argues for a genealogical transformation. ‘When you approach the other side of representation,’ he says, ‘with your feet squarely planted on this side, then nihilism and holiness will be your only options’ (p. 242).7 Let us turn this around. When you approach the other side of nihilism and holiness with your feet squarely planted on this side, failure and need will be your only options. The natural consciousness rejects the true before it seeks it, and it then seeks it only within the terms of that rejection. The rejection is the domination of abstract philosophical consciousness. Beauty is not the freedom from this domination; it is the freedom of its representation as our education—a freedom only available as the education of natural consciousness where representation represents itself, for example in Kant’s third Critique, as both aesthetic and teleological, as beauty and the sublime, and as both formation and finality.8

Much is made by Deleuze of the *AND* that links such relations. But there are two notions of ‘and’ at stake here, not surprisingly given that the real disagreement between the two forms of the speculative precisely
concerns the nature of the middle. Indeed, it is not just a disagreement about the ‘and’ of judgement in Kant and the Deleuzian AND of the rhizome; it also concerns, in itself, the representation of the relation between post-structuralism and modernity. This opens up for us another way in which to illustrate the reproduction of abstract culture within Deleuzian philosophy of education, concerning this time the suppression of spirit—the third partner in the work between infinite and finite, or between truth and representation. In commenting on a draft of this chapter, John Drummond has emphasised most strongly that the rhizome and the tree are not alternatives to each other. Their relation is to be seen as one of interaction, not opposition. In the same vein Paul Standish has argued that, with reference to Bearn’s account, ‘the witnessing of the sublime could exist alongside the exuberance of beauteous intensity and be part of the same student’s experience’ (Blake et al., 2003, p. 221). Rhizomes do not rule out trees. Rather, the rhizome is the moment of experimentation, of flight, in relation to the concrete practices of the arboreal. This same view can be found in Bearn. He is not saying that the University of Beauty is an alternative to the institution of performativity; rather that the Deleuzian teacher can work within the latter to release swarms of multiplicities, that lie suppressed under its technical and managerial discourse:

The primary idea will be intensity, intensity achieved through pointless investigations... It is through achieving pointlessness that one breaks through the frame of representation releasing swarms of intensities, and it is this experience which is the source of breakthroughs which may sometimes actually even increase performativity but which, even if they do not, teach students what real thinking is like: not calculating within a representational frame, but experiencing the joy and ecstasy of breaking through (Bearn, 2000, p. 247).9

The safeguards against lapsing into dualisms are, then, in place: not either rhizomes or trees, but rhizomes AND trees; intensities AND representations; groundlessness AND discourse; Yes AND No. They coexist; the one is always interacting with the other. The rhizomatic teacher does not overcome trees; she is not rhizomatic all the time, nor, therefore, does the rhizome in any sense overcome the trees. The affirmation is not instead of the No; it is the No known affirmatively, not as lack but as possibility.

As we will now see, however, the more poststructuralists protest that the accusation that they are returning to dualisms misses the subtlety of their argument, the more this refusal and denial negates the education they seek to protect. This safeguarding against an oppositional dualism between, say, rhizomes AND trees, betrays itself. As we saw above, for Deleuze the rhizome is between segments. The rhizomatic is the AND. It is the multiplicity between segments; it is the thought without image; the affirmation of difference and repetition. What happens, then, in the relation not between two segments but in rhizome AND tree, that is, when the pair are coupled as coexistent and interacting with each other? Has the multiplicity not become the segment (as Lyotard mourned) wherein

another multiplicity comes, or is it between multiplicity AND non-multiplicity? This is not just a sophistic observation, for it goes to the very ‘centre’ of the different speculative philosophies that are at stake here.

For Bearn, from Lyotard’s point of view, this process by which each multiplicity becomes segment for another multiplicity is the melancholic grey where there is only failure, a failure heralded by a ‘need’ for the holy. From Bearn’s perspective this process is precisely the repetition of difference. It illustrates how each return is different and thus affirmative of itself even if the affirmation becomes the relation to another segment. The affirmation out of dualism is affirmed, again, by the AND, the middle. Whereas for Lyotard the differend was negated by its incorporation into dualism by representation, for Bearn such incorporation only explodes again into the joy and ecstasy of being off balance: precisely difference AND repetition, repetition AND difference. The third, here, the immediacy of the rhizome, comes between segments even if one of the segments is the representation of immediacy itself. This is the crux of the Deleuzian argument against dualism and against negation; it is his argument for imperceptibility.

But Deleuze, and by implication Bearn, have misunderstood Hegel, the negative, the logic of representation and abstraction. First, as we saw a moment ago, in order to argue for immediacy as teaching us how to think, a notion of the middle as education, or as transformation/transvaluation, is presupposed. The criticism made there of Deleuze stands now as a critique of Bearn’s Deleuzianism. If the middle is education—teaching us ‘what real thinking is like’ (Bearn, 2000, p. 247)—then the middle is being presupposed as the identity or the perceptibility of learning.

Second, the assertions of AND against dualism or the binary of either/or also enables us to illustrate the arguments rehearsed above regarding the claims to the middle of Deleuze and Hegel. There is a logic of education from within education which, when played out as the rhizome, realises the complicity of the middle rather than its joys and ecstasies. Perhaps it can be put like this. Rhizomatic difference is the middle, the AND, between segments. But when it is argued that in Deleuze’s speculative philosophy there must be rhizomes AND trees, is this the same AND as in the previous sentence? If it is the same AND, then the return of difference has made no difference. If it is a different AND, then the rhizome is not the first AND, which implies that it was not the middle at all. This means, somewhat bluntly for those wishing to retain the middles as without representation, that education requires, by the logic of itself as difference and repetition, that it be represented as the relation of rhizome and tree. The question then is ‘what is it to learn of education as rhizome AND territory? But it is not in Deleuze, nor in Bearn, that this question is asked, nor this relation represented, for it is this relation that is affirmed as non-relation. The affirmation is represented, however, in the AND of rhizome and tree. Precisely, the affirmation negates itself because it is an education. Being taught that the middle means rhizome and tree, education is re-presenting itself. Its negative moment is not a refusal of affirmation; it is the substance of affirmation. In Hegel, the third partner
who affirms this misrecognition, this domination of abstraction, is, as we saw above, spirit. In Lyotard, it is the recognition of this mis-recognition which is the third partner, the holy. But in Bearn, as in Deleuze, it is the third partner that is consistently suppressed by the presupposition of education as difference, but not itself of difference. It is this suppression that then takes form as the ‘need’ for affirmation, and as the ‘failure’ of philosophy.

At root, then, AND, or the middle, is affirmed in its own work where we, the philosophical observer, can see for ourselves how in this work the middle, to be true to itself as education, must become—has already become—its own object. For us to know this representation is for us to know ourselves as the broken relation of philosophy and education. It is how we know of abstraction, including our own. As observers we know the truth of the relation between philosophy and education, not as failure, or as affirmation but as our education regarding the truth of that relation, as of all dualism and all representation. This truth is spirit when we approach both sides of representation, affirmation and failure, from the broken middle that is the AND. Indeed, this truth is spirit, or it is not known at all. In Deleuze the AND is the Last Man of ressentiment, refusing to be the relation of affirmation and failure. (We will return to this theme in a moment.) In Hegel, as in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, however, that ‘and’ is the ambivalence of philosophy and education, and it is known as such.10

We can take this critique to the very core of Deleuze’s theorising, that is, to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. I shall make three related points here, which will bring this chapter on Nietzsche to a close. First, I shall describe Zarathustra’s own educational journey through the four books of Thus Spake Zarathustra. Second, I shall relate this to Nietzsche’s own journey through his publications from The Birth of Tragedy in 1872 to The Genealogy of Morals in 1887. Third, I shall argue the case that Zarathustra is neither Overman nor imperceptible.

NIETZSCHE’S ZARATHUSTRA

Through the four books, Zarathustra repeatedly learns the same lesson. But because it is learned repeatedly it is also learned differently. In the Prologue, in teaching of the Overman, Zarathustra teaches that God is dead. But his teaching is not comprehended by the crowd that has assembled. ‘They do not understand me,’ he laments. ‘I am not the mouth for these ears’ (Nietzsche, 1982, p. 128). This failure to teach is repeated in each of the following four books of Thus Spake Zarathustra.

In Book 1 his disciples reward their master with a gift of a staff on which ‘a serpent coiled around the sun’ (p. 186).11 At the end of Book 1 Zarathustra realises that they have come to believe what he has taught them, but only abstractly. They have not done what the teaching requires. Thus he demands of his disciples that they leave him. He urges them to resist their teacher, else they might believe him at the cost of their...
own education; ‘resist Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of him! Perhaps he deceived you’ (p. 190). I taught you yourselves he says, yet ‘you had not yet sought yourselves’. In short, ‘one repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil’. Zarathustra’s second failure ends, then, with him saying, ‘I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you’ (ibid.).

At the end of Book 2 Zarathustra learns again of his failure to be the teacher, but here he is learning more about the nature of that failure. When the hunchback asks him why he speaks ‘otherwise to his pupils than to himself’ (p. 254), this is a recognition that Zarathustra is learning for himself in new ways about the nature of being the teacher of the Overman. In Book 2 Zarathustra has learnt the hard lesson of nature as will to power, as ‘that which must always overcome itself’ (p. 227). His will to power has been to teach so that all that blocks the way to the Overman may be overcome. Yet the reason why nature triumphs over the teacher, and the reason why Zarathustra fails as this teacher, is that nature, will to power, must overcome itself. The more successfully he teaches his disciples, the less he himself is overcome. As we saw in Part II above, it is the fate of the enlightened teacher always to dominate in his students that which should only obey itself. Zarathustra learns this lesson as the eternal return in the teacher/student relationship of obeying and commanding. ‘He who cannot obey himself is commanded’ (p. 226). But even the commander must obey nature and must also be overcome. The teacher who is commander must also obey. At this point Zarathustra knows that the teacher must command and be commanded, but he does not as yet know how this is to be done. ‘What persuades the living to obey and command and to practise obedience even when it commands?’ (ibid.). To learn this lesson Zarathustra has to return again to his solitude. Without voice, he hears: ‘your fruit is ripe, but you are not ripe for your fruit’ (p. 259).

Book 3 sees failure being understood differently again. Here it is the most abysmal thought—eternal return—that is Zarathustra’s education. Since the circle of will to power that he is obeying and commanding is universal, it is the nature of all life. Ressentiment and revenge are the attitudes that seek to deny will to power. ‘The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time’s covetousness, that is the will’s loneliest melancholy’ (p. 251). Everything is will to power, and there is no going back. Every event is a victory of will to power, but since nature is that which must overcome itself, even this victory must be overcome. As revenge, this is ‘the will’s gnashing of teeth’, a self-hatred at what it is. But the secret of will to power is that eternal return is the truth not only of all commanding and obeying; it is also the truth of the ressentiment that would overcome or deny will to power. The bitterness at the fact that the will cannot will backwards turns into the joy that even as ressentiment will to power is nature’s truth. Every ‘it was’ is now understood as ‘thus I willed it’ (ibid.). The truth of will to power is eternal return. Here Zarathustra believes he has finally understood his failures as a teacher of the Overman. He had to fail. This is the truth of the teacher. Now,
however, he can will this failure repeatedly, for that is the truth of will to power. At the end of Book 3 we find Zarathustra celebrating this truth in the song of the yes-sayer and amen, the ‘thus I willed it’ song. ‘How should I not lust after eternity and after the nuptial ring of rings?’ he asks. ‘I love you O eternity’ (p. 341). With these words of affirmation for the circle Book 3 comes to an end.

However, Zarathustra’s greatest success is also, as it must be, his greatest failure. Just as he taught his disciples to ‘seek yourselves’, so now he must take his own advice and ‘become who you are’ (p. 351). Sitting on his mountain, alone for years, the Zarathustra of Book 4 is troubled. ‘My happiness is heavy’ (p. 349), he says, for just as in the Prologue Zarathustra again has much he must share with mankind. Only this time he waits for them to come to him. But meanwhile, in the absence of teaching, the truth of his teaching as commanding and obeying is lost. The celebration of eternal return alone on the mountain has become a caricature of itself, eternal return as stasis. The final lesson that Zarathustra learns about his failures as a teacher are the lessons which in the end drive him back down the mountain to enjoy the eternal return of the success and failure of his work. Even on the mountain, joined as he is by the higher men, even there his teaching fails for the best that his guests can do is to will eternal return ‘for Zarathustra’s sake’ (p. 430). This time Zarathustra does not retreat in the face of failure. This time he comprehends failure as the truth of the teacher, the truth of will to power that is the truth of eternal return. This time he knows: ‘all eternal joy longs for failures. For all joy wants itself, hence it also wants agony’ (p. 436). The broken middle of joy and pain is eternal return as will to power and will to power as eternal return. It is, therefore, also the truth of the relation between teacher and student when the teacher becomes his own student and says: ‘was that education? Well then, once more’. Now Zarathustra leaves the mountain, again, but this time not concerned with teaching the Overman, but rather in the work that must be done between the teacher and his students.

ZARATHUSTRA’S NIETZSCHE

There is a corresponding philosophical education in Nietzsche’s own development. For Nietzsche, ‘the law-giver himself eventually receives the call; patere legem, quam ipse tulisti’ [submit to the law you yourself propose] (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 597). In The Birth of Tragedy will to power is present in the tragic, in the ‘primordially One’ (p. 132) and in the ‘glorious consummation’ (p. 47) of Apollo and Dionysus. The Dionysian cannot overcome the Apollinian for the Dionysian is forced to work in the world of images, of concepts and of representations. Equally the Apollinian cannot overcome the Dionysian for every representation will be destroyed by the will that created it. As the nature of commanding and obeying, the desire for peace is also the eternal desire for war. It is, says Nietzsche, ‘an eternal phenomenon: the insatiable will always finds a way to detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on, by means of an

illusion spread over things’ (p. 109). The illusion is within even the law of overcoming.

In the essay ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ (1874), the moment of eternal return is captured in the cows in the field whose memory is not long enough even to know of itself. As such, they remain in eternally forgetful silence. Nietzsche then compares the historical man of memory to the unhistorical man of forgetting. Here the attitude of will to power to itself is apparent. The man of memory never acts because he is always contemplating the implications of past acts. His memory ensures he always puts off action until a clearer picture of the whole emerges, which it never does. The eternity is paralysing to the present. The man of forgetting, however, ‘forgets most things so as to do one thing’ (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 64). This eternity is conducive of the present. Both men are will to power. The memory man is ressentiment against ‘it was’. The forgetful man is will to power as ‘thus I willed it’. But only together and apart in their broken middle are they the comprehension of the eternal return of will to power. At this stage, however, Nietzsche is writing of this as yet unknown idea as required ‘in equal measure’ (p. 63). This equality is not overcoming, it is tension. Only by means of a division, says Nietzsche, is an individual or a nation ‘just as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time’ (ibid.).

In the essay ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (1874) Nietzsche finds in Schopenhauer a teacher who serves life. This teacher is untimely because he represents an ideal that is suppressed by culture, and particularly in education:

The sciences, pursued without any restraint and in a spirit of the blindest laissez-faire, are shattering and dissolving all firmly held belief; the educated classes and states are being swept along by a hugely contemptible money economy ... Everything, contemporary art and science included, serves the coming barbarism (1983, p. 148).

In this essay it is thinking which is will to power. In thinking nature presses towards man ‘as towards something that stands high above us’ (p. 158). In this way, the ‘ideal educates’ (p. 156). Schopenhauer embodies this ideal, for in him education as will to power is able to say ‘this is the picture of all life, and learn from it the meaning of your own life’ (p. 141). Eternal return here is still the ‘tragic contemplation’ (ibid.) of the teacher in whom the ideal still educates.

Between the 1874 essays and the Genealogy of Morals of 1887 come Nietzsche’s books of aphorisms, Human-All-Too-Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science. The education of Nietzsche into the truth of will to power as eternal return is announced abstractly in the end of Book 4 of The Gay Science, and worked through speculatively as the broken middle of Zarathustra’s education as teacher and student. As Nietzsche himself states: ‘within my writings my Zarathustra stands by itself’ (Nietzsche, 1979, p. 35). After Zarathustra Nietzsche says he turned from the yes-saying which culminated in Zarathustra to the no-saying that is ‘the

revaluation of existing values themselves’ (p. 112). If Zarathustra is Nietzsche’s education regarding the whole that is eternal return and will to power, it is an education towards which he was developing in his work up to Zarathustra, and it is an education that he repeats in the work after Zarathustra. Nietzsche can adopt a less aphoristic, more academic style because now he is his own work. There is an objectivity in the critique of values that was not claimed in earlier works. This objectivity is Zarathustra. It is the objectivity of the broken middle—not an abstract objectivity that merely asserts, but a speculative objectivity which knows failure in assertion and, therefore, joy in this eternal return of will to power. What Nietzsche says in the history essay is true for him, becomes him, only in and after Zarathustra, namely, that being is never itself, it is only ‘an un-interrupted has-been, a thing that lives by negating, consuming and contradicting itself’ (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 61). In Zarathustra, and in Nietzsche post-Zarathustra, it is ‘the redeeming man of great love and contempt’ (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 532) who can teach now not merely subjectively but in the (re-evaluated notion of) objectivity of his own commanding and obeying.

In his critiques of morality and of ressentiment, particularly in the Genealogy of Morals, a reading of Zarathustra is also necessary. Here Nietzsche presents the broken middle of commanding and obeying, or of will to power, as the relation of master and slave. The questions that underpin The Genealogy are: ‘under what conditions did man devise [the] value judgements good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess?’ (p. 453). Nietzsche’s answer is well rehearsed. In questioning the value of these values, which act as the foundation of all value judgements, Nietzsche finds their genealogy to lie in the attitudes associated with victory and defeat. That is to say, he finds the value of all values grounded in relations of power and more specifically in the ways in which will to power resolves itself into human character traits and attitudes. What is valued as good represents the character of the noble, but the noble is only he who has established himself above another. Equally, what is valued as bad is that which is ignoble, or merely that which is defined as less than or different from those who enjoy themselves as the Archimedean point of all values.

Nietzsche describes a slave revolt in morality which has several phases. First, in an act of spiritual revenge, the good are recast as evil, and good itself is seen to lie in the sufferers rather than the oppressors. This is the first inversion of values, and is itself political in that it represents the revolt of the vanquished. What is significant about this inversion of values is that it does not conquer its oppressors by physical force and subdue them as they have subdued others. Rather, the battle is fought out from the position of the vanquished. The war is now to redefine strength, ego, and will as bad, and to acknowledge the denial of power, victory and war as truly good. Here, says Nietzsche, it is the attitude of the oppressed that becomes creative, which is wholly different in character from the creative will of the noble. With the latter, good is affirmative of self and of will. With the former, good is the suppression of self and of will. It is not, says
Nietzsche, that the denial of will is good, even though current moral sensibilities still hold to this. It is that this definition of good arises out of a spirit of *ressentiment* against those who have enjoyed the creative power of their will over others. This becomes morality grounded in *ressentiment*, and creates values which reproduce this attitude:

The slave revolt in humanity begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values . . . While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside’, what is ‘different’, what is ‘not itself’; and *this* No is its creative deed (p. 472).

This is characteristic of the ascetic for whom overcoming ‘love and luxury of refinement . . . was the dominating instinct whose demands prevailed against those of all the other instincts’ (pp. 544–545). But Nietzsche describes the significance of the philosophical education of the ascetic. As slave he seeks to overcome his will. But this is precisely an inversion of will to power. When the ascetic realises this, it inspires a *ressentiment* and finally nihilism. It is nihilism because the ascetic knows, now, that he is *all* will to power. His final denial is equally ambivalent. In denying himself redemption he is never stronger or more wilful. His nihilism is that of the Last Man. What he denies now is not will to power itself but its truth as eternal return. This is the education that Zarathustra achieves over the ascetic, and it is why Nietzsche concludes that

as the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness—there can be no doubt of that—morality will gradually perish now: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe—the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most hopeful of all spectacles (p. 597).

This self-consciousness, for Deleuze, is the transmutation into ‘a new way of thinking, feeling and above all being’ (Deleuze, 1983, p. 71). For Nietzsche, this self-consciousness, which is ‘the will to truth become . . . conscious of itself as a problem’ (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 597), has the potential to produce the ‘man of the future’ (p. 532). Such a man will ‘redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of great decision that liberates the will once again’, (ibid.). I shall conclude this discussion of Nietzsche, however, by arguing now that Deleuze and Nietzsche do not have the same teacher in mind.

**ZARATHUSTRA’S MISS MARPLE**

For Deleuze, nihilism is defeated by itself. We saw above that, in knowing will to power as *ressentiment* to be only one of its forms, this knowing of will to power for Deleuze is thinking ‘in a form distinct from that in which
we know it’ (Deleuze, 1983, p. 173). Herein lies the philosophy of
education of Deleuze that we have explored above. Knowledge, he argued,
is merely the result of thinking but learning is its movement; it is the
between which grows out of the relation of segments or faculties.
Learning, then, is becoming for Deleuze. With such a notion of learning
he can assert that the ‘ratio in terms of which the will to power is known is
not the ratio in terms of which it exists’ (p. 175). This statement is pivotal
not only for Deleuze’s interpretation of Zarathustra but for his whole
philosophical project. It rests on a distinction between knowledge as result
and learning as difference, that is, of the difference between difference and
result. Here the merely reactive power of ressentiment is transformed into
an affirmative and creative power of the excess of knowledge. Becoming
and excess are the same thinking—not the ratio cognoscendi of will
to power but the ratio essendi of will to power. Thus, for Deleuze,
destruction becomes active to the extent that the negative is transmuted
and converted into affirmative power: the “eternal joy of becoming”
(p. 174).

Nihilism reaches its completion by passing through the Last Man, but
going beyond him to the man who wants to perish. In the man who wants
to perish, to be overcome, negation has broken everything which still held
it back, it has defeated itself, it has become of affirming, a power which is
already superhuman, a power which announces and prepares the Overman
(p. 175).

Whilst Hegel’s negative says yes to all denials, Deleuze’s Zarathustra
knows to say no even to that (yes to) denial. Here is the transvaluation of
value. What is at stake between Hegel and Deleuze, then, not least within
the philosophy of education, is the educational significance of negation.
Deleuze sees in Hegel a repetition of the same, of negation. As such,
nothing happens. For Deleuze, however, ‘the negative becomes a power of
affirming: it is subordinated to affirmation and passes into the service of an
excess of life’ (p. 176). ‘Only affirmation produces what the negative
announces’ (ibid.).

One thing is clear here. Deleuze and Hegel are both speculative thinkers
trying to ascertain what is learned in the adventures of the negative. They
meet, in a sense, at the point of the negation of the negation. Here Hegel
argues for a determinate negation, and a negative that becomes positive in
its own work and its relation to knowledge—the truth of the slave to the
master. Deleuze argues for an education regarding a transformation of
value where the ‘power’ and ‘autonomy’ (ibid.) of the negative are
converted into affirmation. In these respective educations, Hegel realises
the philosopher whilst Deleuze finds the Overman, where the scholar is
replaced by the legislator (p. 173).

Which of these different notions of philosophical education is correct?
Which of them provides a criterion by which any such judgement could be
made? If we use Nietzschean terms to explore this, then the question
becomes ‘which of these speculative enquiries is true to will to power and
its eternal return?’ Deleuze claims for Nietzsche the discovery of ‘the negativity of the positive’ (p. 180), where negations here ‘form part of the powers of affirming’ and overcome Hegel’s ‘positivity of the negative’ (ibid.). For Deleuze, eternal return is the return of that which differs. For Hegel, eternal return is of the negative but as the concept. Deleuze argues that eternal return as a physical doctrine of being is the ‘new formulation of the speculative synthesis’ (p. 68), where conformity to a law of identity is now overcome by the principle of selection in difference and repetition that constitutes will to power. In addition, ‘as an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the practical synthesis: whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return’ (ibid.). But what can be willed eternally? Only difference itself or, as we have seen it above, the no-saying to all negativity, all reaction. Only in thinking, in the ‘thought of the eternal return’ (p. 69), is willing also creativity. ‘Only the eternal return makes the nihilistic will whole and complete’ (ibid.). Zarathustra, for Deleuze, is such a completion, and it would be, we may suppose, the rhizomatic teacher-becoming.

I want to bring this discussion of Deleuze to an end by making three related criticisms of his Nietzscheanism: first, that Deleuze does not overcome ressentiment; second, that he resembles the Last Man, the ascetic; and third, that the rhizomatic teacher-becoming represents nihilism in the suppression of the meaning of modern political experience. Finally, out of these criticisms comes a different kind of Nietzschean teacher.

First, then, the speculative synthesis as Deleuze understands it is, I would argue, only another form of un-reformed ressentiment. If the slave revolt is the representation of will to power as morality, then the rhizome is the representation of will to power as affirmation. It is not a thought without image; on the contrary, a thought without image is a moral value masquerading as a transformed value. It is where will to power is asserted, again, against its own law that it must overcome itself. The middle is not a new value. It is an old value dressed in post-structural garb. The fact that the middle is eternally overcome, and that thought is eternally returned from the middle to its aporetic structure by its own law, is suppressed by Deleuze’s concept of the middle. Indeed, epistemological ressentiment is as strong a force as moral ressentiment. Where the latter is reactive, the former, in contrast, identifies itself as act, as will. Yet its ‘no’ to nihilism is rhetorical; it is not actual. A ‘no’ to nihilism is not a transvaluation; it is the return of ressentiment this time against its representation of itself. The determinate negation in Hegel contains the truth of ressentiment, that it is total and cannot be overcome without repeating itself, and, therefore, is never overcome. But ressentiment is not only negative; it is true to itself in negation. The ‘yes’ to the negative is the truth of ressentiment, recognised but not overcome. Deleuze’s ‘no’ to the negative is a ressentiment against the truth of ressentiment. The whole idea of ressentiment overcome must include the negation of itself as ressentiment.

We can begin to see the implications of Deleuze’s ressentiment against ressentiment by comparing it to the Trauerspiel, which was explored
earlier in Chapter 2. There, Benjamin argued that Baroque allegory re-presented a theological situation through a myth which masked this re-presentation. Post-Luther, the desertion of God from the acts of men realised an unhappy consciousness divided against itself by a loss of meaning both inwardly and outwardly. The former re-presented rejection from the world as rejection of the world (asceticism), whilst the latter re-presented rejection of the world as rejection from the world (political intrigue). We argued above that allegory became the re-presentation of culture as myth without enlightenment regarding the social and spiritual conditions of its own possibility. Baroque allegory did not see itself formed by its relation to the absolute, nor its being re-formed as a repetition of that relation.

Reason can do better than this. As culture it can realise just such repetitions and re-formations. The absolute here becomes the most important concept in the critique of the abstract domination of culture, for it knows its truth as its own work, but equally not as its resolution. The absolute is the only concept able to do this, to speak the truth as *ressentiment* without a denial that further terrorises its culture, its representation or its education. But the kind of post-structuralism found in Deleuze returns again to the suppression of the culture of reason and is, therefore, also the suppression of our philosophical education regarding domination. Post-structuralism in the manner of Deleuze’s imperceptible middles also re-presents the relation of state and religion without acknowledgement of such. In the desertion of the absolute from the formal person of civil society, post-structuralism asserts the myth of the ruin and collapse of subjectivity. This ‘no’ to the substance of subjectivity is the modern form of philosophical asceticism. Knowing that he is all desire, this ascetic refuses himself philosophical substance as subject. It is a denial in the tradition of the slave revolt, one made in *ressentiment*, as a moral value against the self being known in the tradition of the slave revolt. It is, at its most resentful, the nihilism of the ascetic made into the myth of the decline and ruin of the self. It refuses any relation to the relation of self and the world, because it refuses our education as the re-presentation of the relation (in all its difficulty); a refusal from which it then asserts the transformation, or education, from *ressentiment* to the joy of experiment and the imperceptible. The middle in Deleuze is just such a *ressentiment* against abstraction or against modern social and political relations—a freedom from duality by positing the ruin of subjectivity as without substance. But duality here is not overcome; it is merely denied. There is only the domination of abstract philosophical consciousness. There is no Overman—only the ascetic who, in denying himself, claims will to power as his own positivity and who, in doing so, repeats the culture of reason that is supposed to have been overcome. There is no Overman in Nietzsche who survives or overcomes this culture, or who transforms it. But there is a teacher in Nietzsche who can learn of *ressentiment* as the true, and can recognise therein the relation of philosophy and education in which the absolute is realised, or re-presented as representation. This teacher can affirm the eternal return of will to
power precisely because he cannot affirm it. The culture of the eternal return of will to power, its formation and re-formation, is not overcoming. Nietzsche affirms the positive in the negative but not the negative in the positive. The former recognises values, the latter only repeats them. Here, in the former, the ‘no’ to ‘no’ is affirmed philosophically as education, but it is not overcome. Nietzsche’s political recognition of the dominance of the culture of abstract reason is to be found here, in the paradox of overcoming not-overcoming, and in the philosophical education that knows itself as this circle.

There is a further implication here for Deleuze. It is because he posits difference as the identity of the middle that he can claim, as we saw, that the subject can unmake the face, can be liberated from the wall of identity by merging into it, and can become imperceptible. But imperceptibility is also an idea whose genealogy is ressentiment against abstraction, or against dominant social and political relations. This domination ensures that we are always in part exactly as we appear to be: formal, bourgeois persons defined in and by modern property relations. Our abstract philosophical consciousness is dominant and is that against which any notion of the imperceptible must be re-presented. Imperceptibility as thought without image is in actuality imperceptibility as thought without politics, without determination.

Suppressing the political, then, imperceptibility in Deleuze appears as independent of the dualism of abstraction and experience. His middles are between but not of the segments. There are immense dangers in eliding the political in this way. It opens the line to the intriguer who re-presents political difficulty in a myth of being without truth. It matters not whether myth is baroque or post-structural, for the dissemblance of abstraction without mediation, and of ethics without metaphysics, is the path again to terror and tyranny where ‘anything can be made to stand for anything else... because nothing is absolute’ (Jarvis, 1998, p. 10).

As such, there can be no sustainable concept of the teacher in Deleuze’s philosophy because there is no one for whom the experience of difference is allowed to speak for itself and re-present this broken middle as philosophical education. Learning in Deleuze, in being claimed as learning, is not left open to its relation to being known, nor, therefore, to the social relations which determine it. It is in the relation of being known that learning can participate in its own act. How can the teacher participate in her own act of learning if she is granted immunity from the very relation—that generates the learning? She has to be different even from learning in order to participate in the circle of possibility and necessity that Deleuze might call—but does not—becoming-learning. And in order to be different from learning she has to be the subject whose natural consciousness has learning as an object.

What, then, are the implications for the teacher of this critique of the construction of the imperceptible in Deleuze? As we saw above, towards the end of Dialogues, Deleuze likens the imperceptible to the knight of faith in Kierkegaard. They share, he says, an interest in movement that ‘is
always in the middle—in the middle of two other lines’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002, p. 127). Movement unmakes the face; movement is the process of becoming; it is multiplicities; it is, in essence, the idea by which Deleuze distinguishes his thought from territorialisation, identity and negativity. And yet, the choice here of the knight of faith by Deleuze to represent movement stands opposed to itself in a way that compromises, and must compromise, such movement.

We will explore the knights of faith and infinite resignation in the next chapter. Here we can say that Deleuze is wrong to see his idea of the imperceptible in the Kierkegaardian knight of faith. In Nietzschean terms, the knights, between them, obey the law of nature of commanding and obeying. They know will to power in resignation, and they know eternal return in faith. They know the truth of the relation in the same way as Zarathustra does, as the experience of the broken middle of philosophy and education. The knight of faith is absolutely not the same rhizomatic movement as Deleuze’s grass between the paving stones. Quite the contrary: as with trees, the knights also have roots that speak of the true relation of their philosophical education. Weil says: ‘it is the light falling continually from heaven which alone gives a tree the energy to send powerful roots deep into the earth. The tree is really rooted in the sky’ (Miles, 1986, p. 86). And Rose repeats this quotation, both in her discussion of Weil (Rose, 1993, p. 218) and in her posthumous work Paradiso. She writes

What courage is summoned by this icon of the visible and the invisible. To be a tree. To be suspended in the empyrean, with no security, no identity, no community. Yet only this willingness to be suspended in the sky, to be without support, enables us to draw on the divine source and sustenance which makes it possible to put down roots. It is not the prior fixity of established roots that qualify us to drink greedily out of the sky. The sky is universal—it is the silky canopy that moves with us wherever we go. And we feel lost, we are in the abyss; and the sky has become dark and occluded, we need to pull up those roots for the channel of grace is run dry. We need to venture again the courage of suspense, not knowing who we are, in order to rediscover our infinite capacity for self-creation and response to our fellow self-creators. Orthodoxy embraces exile (Rose, 1999, p. 63).

The movement that Deleuze claims as moving in such a way that it can paint ‘grey on grey (Deleuze, 2002, p. 127), or, like the Pink Panther, paint the world ‘in his own colour’ (ibid.), is not the movement of education—neither political education regarding the forms of law that pre-determine the form and content of movement, nor its philosophical re-presentation. Deleuze’s Pink Panther is the movement of Zarathustra at the end of Book 3, dancing the ring of rings, but it is not the story of Zarathustra as a whole, or of Nietzsche’s own development. In its post-structuralist form this movement is a dialectic of nihilism—dialectic because its disavowal of relation is relation, and nihilistic because both relations are disavowed. As such, post-structuralism is a response to and a representation of the
modern aporia of law and reason, but it is one in which these conditions of its own possibility are repeatedly denied. Even this repetition is repeatedly denied as re-presentation. At worst, the rhizomatic teacher-becoming is the dissembler whose roots are not in education. He is the relation of thought and being that takes upon himself immunity from prosecution in the court of modern abstract reason. Those who lack roots have neither depth nor dependency; they are between the relation of teacher and student but not of the relation. They have no notion of education grounded in the real educational relations that they re-present. They mistake the aporia of subjectivity for the decline of subjectivity per se. They are, again, the aestheticisation of the political, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, can be the godless spirituality in which evil thrives, and this time with the increased potency that imperceptibility brings with it.

There is, however, a different model of imperceptibility and the knights of faith and resignation that can be offered to teachers here. The example, from Rose, is Agatha Christie’s Miss Jane Marple. The sleuth is much more the knight of faith that Kierkegaard intends. In Miss Marple we can recognise the recollection of the woman with the mind like a bacon slicer; she knows that she does not know; and we can recognise the repetition of this ignorance in her ordinary appearance as ‘a proper, fussy, inquisitive old lady’ (Rose, 1993, p. 222). Her success ‘in establishing justice invariably depends on her being able to pass unnoticed whilst noticing everything herself’ (ibid.). The infinite, known as not known, is known here as ‘the paradox of existence’ (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 47). Miss Marple carries truth within the duality that masks it. Her ambivalence commends ‘something transcendent’ (Rose, 1999, p. 18) for in her ‘identity’ truth sees everything whilst itself being unseen. Such work, says Rose, moves ‘beyond the preoccupation with endless loss [the post-structural dissembler] to the silence of grace’ (p. 17). This relation of resignation, faith and the transcendent means that Miss Marple ‘remains the most observant intelligence and the most spiritually free in all manner of woeful situations’ (Rose, 1993, p. 222). The third partner is always present in the abstraction, and its recollection and repetition, that Miss Marple is and knows herself to be.

This presents quite a contrast for the teacher here: the Deleuzian rhizomatic teacher and the Marplesque and Zarathustrian teacher. The latter commends being master and servant, teacher and student so that the truth of education can exist without new forms of suppression or violence. The former is just such suppression masked by the deceit of relation masquerading as non-relation. In modern social relations, where abstraction is dominant, the teacher must be partly exactly as she appears to be—a teacher in all its ordinariness—in order to teach, unnoticed, for education. As justice in its aporetic form encompasses the truth of Miss Marple’s broken middle, so, education in its aporetic form can encompass the truth of the teacher. Both require faith, but faith to be knowing and unknowing, powerful and powerless, natural and philosophical consciousness, and commander and obeyer. This is the truth of Zarathustra, as of Nietzsche, and it is the truth of the relation of philosophy and education as
it is re-presented in Nietzsche’s work. Like Zarathustra one must learn to teach and become a teacher in order, then, to teach to learn. There is a grace in the teacher whose faith is in the whole of education, a whole of which she is its eternal return and its will to power.

NOTES
1. I am keeping to Deleuze’s use of upper case for the term ‘AND’.
2. We return to the knight of faith at the end of this chapter and again in the concluding chapter.
3. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze defines ‘differentiation’ as ‘the determination of the virtual content into an idea’ (p. 207), and ‘differenciation’ as the ‘actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts’ (ibid.). I have not in this chapter explored the relation between the virtual and the actual in Deleuze, nor, therefore, the two sides of his transcendental empiricism. My remarks below about the coexistence of multiplicity AND segment give an example of the kind of critique that would be offered if I had done so.
4. I have attempted this in greater detail in Tubbs, 2004, Chapter 5.
5. This is also to read Lyotard’s later work against that of his middle period, specifically *Libidinal Economy*.
6. Lyotard is due a certain sympathy here. The moment he acknowledges the third partner in philosophical work, the absolute, or philosophy itself, he is dumped by those who have courted him.
7. Precisely the philosophical perspective—nihilism and holiness—of Zarathustra in Book VI of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. This is explained in the following sections of the current chapter.
8. I defend such a reading of Kant in Tubbs, 2004, Chapter 1.
9. Or, as stated elsewhere within the philosophy of education, ‘you should work within the system, but work carefully at its weak spots’ (Blake et al., 2000, p. 117).
10. I defend this view of ‘and’ in the final chapter of Tubbs, 2004. There I argue that ‘and’ is the presence of social and political relations within relation itself, which requires, therefore, to be recognised as both domination ‘and’ philosophy’s higher education.
11. The image conjured up here is of an uroboros—the snake or dragon that swallows its own tail as an emblem of infinity or wholeness. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche notes that ‘logic coils up . . . and finally bites its own tail’ (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 98).
12. Recollection and repetition are used here as Kierkegaardian terms. Their educational import is explained more fully in the final chapter below.